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Thirty Years after the Iranian Revolution:
Islam, Democracy and the Crisis of
Legitimacy
The 2009 presidential election in Iran marks an epoch
not only in Iranian history but in the Middle East as
whole. For the first time after the 1979 revolution, the
three defeated candidates with extensive
revolutionary credentials openly challenged the
validity of the election, accusing the government of
massive fraud that had resulted in the reelection of
the incumbent president Mahmud Ahmadinejad. To
be sure, the previous election (2005) was not entirely
devoid of controversy as the candidate Mehdi
Karrubi had leveled fraud accusations against the

[1]

government, but the controversy was little more than
ephemeral and posed no serious challenge to the
government’s authority. However, the latest
allegations and the ensuing protests in Tehran and
other major cities struck an unprecedented blow to
the legitimacy of the entire political system, which
has over the past three decades relied on people’s
votes to meet the exigencies of a republic.
While the protests started with a simple slogan
—“where is my vote?”—they ostensibly targeted
more than a seemingly fraudulent election. Indeed
they called into question the legitimacy of a
government that could no longer be trusted with
safeguarding people’s rights and interests. The 2009
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presidential election has thus uncovered inner
conflicts that had long lain dormant in the
foundations of the Iranian political system—conflicts
that raised serious questions about the extent to which
ideological and factional interests could take
precedence over both democratic principles and
Islamic ideals of governance.

variety of public demands. This issue of the
Sociology of Islam and Muslim Societies Newsletter
provides insight into this political crisis. A number of
scholars and specialists of Iranian contemporary
politics offer their analyses on the current state of
affairs and the future prospects of change in Iran. The
Newsletter’s editors hope that the six articles and one
interview in this issue will contribute to a better
understanding of the ongoing crisis in Iran.

More importantly, the 2009 election has induced the
emergence of the Iranian Green Movement as a
broad-based platform for a host of social, economic,
and political demands. The Green Movement’s
strength lies in its pluralistic character and its
nonviolent strategy. While the unfettered violence,
perpetrated by the Iranian government and its militia
surrogates, has helped curb the eruption of street
protests, the Green Movement seems to have retained
its vast potentials for mobilizing political forces
within Iranian society.

Tugrul Keskin
Najm al-Din Yousefi

The Movement’s leadership—consisting of the two
defeated candidates, Mir Hossein Moussavi and
Mehdi Karroubi, plus the former president
Mohammad Khatami—has emphasized time and
again that a viable solution to the current crisis must
be sought within the framework of the Iranian
constitution, which embraces both Islamic principles
and democratic procedures. Yet the government’s
denial of any political crisis as well as its interest in
putting the Movement’s leader on trial has dashed any
hopes for a reconciliatory rapprochement. Many of
the Green Movement’s supporters, on the other hand,
feel strongly about the government’s violent
crackdown on peaceful demonstrations, its torture
and killing of political dissidents, and its utter
disregard of the citizens’ civil rights, which in turn
has rendered any compromise ineffective.
It is hard to predict the outcome of the current
deadlock. It is clear, however, that the Green
Movement will continue to serve as a platform for a
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Reflections on Democracy, Non-Violence
and Political Change in Iran

quick succession, to the shock and bewilderment of
their conservative rivals.
The first item on the legislative agenda of reformdominated 6th parliament (2000-2004) was to
overturn an illiberal press law passed in the final days
of the outgoing hard-line parliament. The print media
in Iran had flourished during President Khatami’s
first term and quickly became a bastion of support for
pro-democracy activists. Courageous journalists and
editors were breaking political taboos by transcending
the narrow ideological confines of Iran’s postrevolutionary elite consensus. A public sphere was
created whereby Iranian society was in full scale
debate – to the mortification of the ruling clerical
establishment – about the relationship between
tradition and modernity, religion and democracy and
the moral basis of legitimate political authority.

Nader Hashemi
Assistant Professor of Middle East and Islamic
Politics,
Josef Korbel School of International Studies,
University of Denver
Nader.Hashemi@du.edu
Struggles for democracy generally require three
critical ingredients for success: effective and
incorruptible leadership, a strategy for mass
mobilization and a sense of hope that engenders
sacrifice. Last year at this time, none of these existed
in Iran. The clerical oligarchy was firmly in control,
the Reform movement was in disarray and political
apathy reigned supreme. Today, eight months after
the disputed presidential election, all three key
ingredients are now firmly in place.
Defying
expectations, Iran’s Green Movement (Jonbesh-e
Sabz-e Iran) soldiers on in the face of an authoritarian
regime whose brutal suppression has failed to
intimidate or subdue it. Whether this movement will
be triumphant is unknown but what is clear is that an
indigenous movement for democracy has delivered a
major blow to the Islamic Republic: Iranian politics
henceforth will never be the same. How did these
three elements come together?
Understanding the origins and the defiant posture of
the leadership of the Green Movement requires
returning to an event in August 2000 that marked a
critical denouement for the reformist-conservative
struggle in Iran. At this time, the Reform Movement
was in its prime, winning landslide elections at the
presidential, municipal and most recently the
parliamentary level. Hope for democratic change was
in the air as Reformers captured all of the key
democratically-contested institutions of the state in

Nader Hashemi
As parliamentary debate on the press law began with
the eyes of the nation upon it, the speaker suddenly
intervened to halt the proceedings. He announced
that he had just received an important summons from
the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei demanding that
the existing (illiberal) press law not be revised and
that all debate in on this topic cease immediately.
Khamenei’s letter – which angry MPs forced the

[3]
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speaker to read into the parliamentary record –
specifically warned that “should the enemies of
Islam, the revolution and the Islamic system take over
or infiltrate the press, a great danger would threaten
the security, unity and the faith of the people….The
current [press] law … has been able to prevent the
appearance of this great calamity, and [therefore], its
amendment and similar actions that have been
anticipated by the parliamentary committee are not
legitimate and not in the interest of the country and
the system.”(1)
Scuffles and fistfights broke out among rival
members of parliament. Several deputies walked out
in protest as chaos soon enveloped the parliamentary
chamber. The speaker tried to restore calm by
reminding everyone that the Supreme Leader’s
actions were legally permissible. “Our constitution
has the elements of the absolute rule of the supreme
clerical leader [velayat-i motlaq faqih] and you all
know this and approve of this. We are all duty-bound
to abide by it.”(2) The speaker at the time was Mehdi
Karoubi, a 2009 Reformist presidential candidate and
today one of the courageous leaders of the Green
Movement, famous for exposing a policy of
systematic rape in Iranian prisons. His defiance of
Khamenei today, in contrast to his deference nine
years ago, is worth noting.
After the June 2009 election, and following a
week of demonstrations that brought three million
people into the streets of Tehran, Khamenei delivered
his much anticipated Friday sermon. He publicly
endorsed Ahmadinejad as president, declared the
election to be free and fair on balance and then went a
step further. Similar to his August 2000 intervention,
he forcefully demanded a halt to all debate on the
topic, declaring the issue resolved while threatening
the opposition with violence if their defiance
persisted. This time, however, the senior leadership
of the reform movement stood firm and boldly defied
the explicit wishes of the Supreme Leader. This

marked a critical turning point in the relationship
between reformers and the Islamic Republican
establishment. Their disobedience inspired millions
of Iranians and provided Iran’s democratic forces
with the internal leadership it desperately sought and
previously lacked.
By all measures, the leadership of the Green
Movement comprised of the troika of Mir Hossein
Mousavi (former Prime Minister), Mehdi Karoubi
(former Speaker of Parliament) and Muhammad
Khatami (former President), can be characterized as
relatively mild and measured in their speeches and
political statements. All remain loyal to the Islamic
Republic, its current constitution and the political
theology of Ayatullah Khomeini, albeit emphasizing a
democratic and humanistic reading of this legacy.
Nonetheless, despite repeated warnings from the
Supreme Leader and a growing chorus of hard-line
opinion demanding their arrest – and more recently
their execution – the leadership continues its defiance
of established power and its steadfast support for the
civil and human rights of their fellow citizens. The
future of the Green Movement and any hope for an
eventual democratic transition in Iran will be
dependent on the ongoing resistance of these leaders.
The strategy of mass mobilization and street
protests has at best a tenuous link to Iran’s Green
leadership.
It has been accurately reported that
leaders are responding to and being led by society
and not the opposite. In his most recent statement to
the nation, (No. 17, January 1, 2010), Mousavi
explicitly acknowledged the point that protests are
occurring not because he has called people into the
streets but rather due to the prevalence of
“widespread social and civil networks that were
formed during and after the election through the
people themselves and which continue to self
generate.”(3) This fascinating development suggests
the extent to which the Green Movement has
penetrated key sectors of Iranian society based on the
[4]
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existence of underground networks of activists
scattered in major cities who rely on the internet and
mobile phone technology to spread their message.
This also explains why the movement has been hard
to crush, notwithstanding the best efforts of the
regime.
And finally there is the issue of hope. In a
recent in-depth report on the state of human rights
Iran after the June election, Amnesty International
noted that “human rights violations in Iran are now as
bad as at any time in the past 20 years.”(4) To date,
the Islamic Republic has imprisoned almost every
leading opposition figure, human and civil rights
activist, student leader and dissident journalist. In
fact, it is hard to think of the name of prominent
Iranian pro-democracy activist that the regime has not
arrested. In its desperation, it even picked up the
sister of Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Shireen Ebadi,
an apolitical figure, with the sole intention of
intimidating her more famous sibling.
Ye t n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h i s r e p r e s s i v e
atmosphere replete with show trials, torture, rape,
death and threats of mass executions, Iranians who
sympathize with the Green Movement today are
experiencing a deep sense of hope, cautious optimism
and at times exhilaration about the prospects of a
better future. There is a general appreciation that a
transition to democracy will not emerge without
significant sacrifice and a long-term commitment to
oppositional activity. A rejection of violent revolution
and a commitment to a strategy of nonviolence
resistance by necessity demands patience, prudence
and time. In the words of Columbia University
Professor Hamid Dabashi: “This is not sprint but a
marathon.”
A realization that there are no quick fixes to
the problem of political authoritarianism in Iran is
informed by the fact that the Iranian regime, despite
being shaken and confused, remains firmly in control
of the key institutions of violence, the administration

of justice and economic production (largely oil).
Evidence that this control has weakened is shaky at
best. Moreover, the Iranian regime, in part due to its
control over the media, retains significant support in
rural and poorer areas of the country including a core
group of loyal devotees who dominate the upper
echelons of the security forces, many of whom
believe that Ali Khamenei is God’s representative on
earth.
The next stage of confrontation is set for early
summer. Expectations are for a similar repetition of
defiant street protests, a harsh government crackdown
and then a wave of mass arrests. Meanwhile Iran’s
Green Movement continues its nonviolent resistance.
Its future success will depend on whether the three
key ingredients for democratic change – effective
leadership, a strategy for mass mobilization and hope
– remain in place and grow stronger with time.
Nader Hashemi teaches Middle East and Islamic
Politics at the Josef Korbel School of International
Affairs at the University of Denver. He is the author
of Islam, Secularism and Liberal Democracy: Toward
a Democratic Theory for Muslim Societies (Oxford
University Press, 2009)
NOTES:
1)

The full text of Khamenehi’s letter appeared in Hamshahri
(Tehran), 7 August 2000.
2)

Nazila Fathi, “Iranian Leader Bars Press Bill of Reform Bloc,”
New York Times, 7 August 2000.
3)

Statement No. 17 (January 1, 2010) taken from Mir Hossein
Mousavi’s Official Website: http://www.kaleme.org/1388/10/11/
klm-7047 (translation is mine).
4)

I’m quoting from the press release available at: http://
www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/report/post-electioniran-violations-among-worst-20-years-20091210. The full
report’s uses identical language and is accessible at: http://
www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE13/123/2009/en/
1e69a8fb-dcf1-4165-a7fc-a94369e364bf/mde131232009en.pdf
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Counter-Revolution and Revolt in Iran

By Danny Postel

and the Politics of Modernization: Negotiating
Modernity in Iran, by “introducing democratic
theories and ideas to a generation of Iranian
intellectuals and political figures who latter played
significant roles in the democratic and reform
movement.”(2)

Author, Reading "Legitimation Crisis" in Tehran
http://www.press.uchicago.edu/presssite/metadata.epl?
mode=synopsis&bookkey=211444
Contributing Editor, Logos: A Journal of Modern
Society & Culture
http://www.logosjournal.com/
dannypostel@gmail.com

Sadly for those of us not literate in Persian, only one
of his numerous books is available in English: the
monumental State and Revolution in Iran, a largely
Gramscian analysis of the Iranian Revolution
published in 1984 — alas, long out of print and
extremely difficult to find (only a single used copy is
available via Amazon and not one via Powell’s). (3)

Hossein Bashiriyeh is one of
post-revolutionary Iran’s key
political thinkers. Known as the
father of political sociology in
Iran, he has influenced, through
his voluminous writings and his
24 years teaching political
science at the University of
Tehran (1983-2007), both the
study and practice of politics in
Iran.
In his recent book Iran’s
Intellectual Revolution, Mehran Kamrava describes
Bashiriyeh as “one of the country’s most influential
and most serious thinkers and analysts.” Bashiriyeh’s
two and a half decades as a scholar and mentor in Iran,
Kamrava writes

His books in Persian include Revolution and Political
Mobilization (1991), Political Sociology (1993),
History of Political Thought in the 20th Century
[Volume I, Marxist Thought, Volume II, Liberal and
Conservative Thought] (1994-96), The Kingdom of
Reason (1993), Civil Society and Political
Development in Iran (1998), New Theories in Political
Science (1999), Sociology of Modernity (1999), The
State and Civil Society (2000), 20th Century Theories
of Culture (2000), Obstacles to Political Development
in Iran (2001), Lessons on Democracy for Everyone
(2001), Political Science for Everyone (2001), An
Introduction to the Political Sociology of Iran: The
Era of the Islamic Republic (2002), and Transition to
Democracy: Theoretical Issues (2006).

An Interview with Iranian Political
Scientist Hossein Bashiriyeh

have left indelible marks on successive generations of
political science graduates, many of whom have gone
on to become academics themselves or have secured
policy-making positions in the state bureaucracy.(1)
Bashiriyeh has figured critically in Iranian public life,
says Ali Mirsepassi, author of Intellectual Discourse
[6]

His translations from English to Persian include
Hobbes’s Leviathan, Barrington Moore’s Social
Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Hubert
Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow’s Michel Foucault, Beyond
Structuralism and Hermeneutics, and Robert Holub’s
Jürgen Habermas: Critic in the Public Sphere.(4)
Among the subjects Bashiriyeh explores in his 2003
essay collection Reason in Politics are the Frankfurt
School, liberalism and anarchism, Weber and Islam,
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and class struggles, political ideology and identitybuilding after the Iranian Revolution.

basically authoritarian electoral theocracy had been
more or less experiencing a number of crises, affecting
its bases of power: ideological-authoritarian regimes,
generally speaking, may develop crises in the sphere of
their ideological legitimacy, administrative efficiency,
internal elite cohesion, and coercive capacity. If all
these crises occur at the same time, the situation may be
described as revolutionary; out of these crises emerge
the necessary ingredients for a political opposition too,
i.e. mass discontent, ideology, leadership and
organization.

In the summer of 2007 Bashiriyeh was fired from the
University of Tehran (the handiwork of the “Committee
of Cultural Revolution and Purges of Universities”).
(5) The previous year, President Ahmadinejad had
challenged Iran’s university students to “scream” and
ask, “Why are there liberal and secular professors in
universities?”(6)
Bashiriyeh has since taken a position in the Department
of Political Science at Syracuse University, where he
teaches courses on Middle Eastern Political Systems,
Islamic Political Thought, Social Theory and the
Middle East, the Politics of Modern Iran and
Comparative Revolutions.

So for a revolutionary situation to develop at least eight
factors are required: the four regime factors (crises) and
the four revolutionary-movement factors. Obviously all
these factors are dialectically interrelated and enhance
each other. In the case of the Iranian regime before the
election, I would say that a considerable degree of the
first two crises had already come about, but the crisis of
unity and cohesion had been contained since 2004, and
there was no crisis of coercion or domination at all. I
think that the aftermath of the election signified a quite
unprecedented crisis of elite cohesion and unity, further
intensifying the crises of legitimacy and efficiency.
Never before had an internal rift caused such a largescale mass mobilization of opposition.

The following interview was conducted via e-mail
between June and August of 2009.
Danny Postel: As the author of a classic study of the
Iranian Revolution (The State and Revolution in Iran),
and given your recent comparative work on
“transitional situations,” what are your impressions of
what’s been happening in Iran in the aftermath of the
June 12 presidential election?2 Some have argued that
we are witnessing “a great emancipatory event” (Slavoj
Žižek)(7); “something quite extraordinary, perhaps
even a social revolution” (Hamid Dabashi); a “velvet
coup” (Anoush Ehteshami); “the final acts of a
protracted war for the control of the Iranian
economy” (Behzad Yaghmaian); even an attempt to
abolish the people (Pepe Escobar).(8) How would you
characterize the situation?

In the specific case of the Iranian regime, a more or less
chronic crisis of legitimacy had been caused by a
number of factors and developments. Four major
causes can be identified: (1) the rise of a more
republican interpretation of the dominant Islamist
ideology; (2) the contradictory nature of the
Constitution, in terms of seeking to combine theocratic
and democratic principles of legitimacy; (3) an
increasingly noticeable gap between ruling-class
practice and its legitimizing ideals; and (4) a widening
gap between public opinion and official ideology as a
result of the increasing secularization of social values
and attitudes. In any case even if the elected offices
may be said to be periodically legitimized by popular

Hossein Bashiriyeh: I think that the aftermath of the
election constituted a catalyst for a potentially
revolutionary situation facing a government caught in a
number of crises. More specifically, it has signified a
fatal crisis of cohesion and unity. Of course the
[7]
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elections (although elections are controlled), the
unelected offices are no doubt subject to an erosion of
legitimacy as a result of the four factors I’ve outlined.
As I will explain later, I think the grave crisis of
cohesion and unity resulting from the June election
has also actualized the underlying crisis of legitimacy.

Ayatollah Khomeini himself. But as mentioned, never
before 2009 had internal divisions led to such a mass
political mobilization and massive repression. From
the beginning, the Islamic state witnessed internal
divisions over economic policy, the interpretation of
Islamic law, emphasis on the Islamic vs. republican
nature of the Constitution, and so on. In the 1980s two
parties emerged: the Party of Tradition and the Party
of Khomeinists; the former supported nonintervention in economic affairs and a traditionalist
jurisprudence; the latter advocated economic
intervention and redistribution, as well as a dynamic
jurisprudence — but this division was contained as a
result of Khomeini’s arbitration.

In terms of a crisis of efficient management, I would
argue that the Islamist government has suffered from a
chronic crisis of efficiency throughout its rule; the
more recent intensification of the crisis since 2005 has
resulted from irregular and erratic economic policies
and practices, political nepotism and general
mismanagement. The adoption of a politically useful
discourse of alms-based Islamic welfare policy by the
Fundamentalist faction in power has, according to
expert views, caused economic disruption, inflation,
recession and more unemployment. Irregular
redistributive policies, price intervention, and a
reduction in interest rates have contributed to the
critical situation. Obviously in the absence of a crisis
of cohesion and elite unity, economic problems may
have no political outcomes, but as rifts develop within
the regime, they may expand the possibility of
political mobilization by opposition forces. However,
in the actual mass political mobilization in the
aftermath of the election, the motivating force was not
the economic conditions, but rather what I consider to
be a sense of political frustration and inefficacy
mainly on the part of the urban middle classes, who
found their vote and their political participation to be
of no consequence in changing the political situation.
The mass mobilization resulted from a gap between
rising political expectations and the outcome of the
election — a gap which has become very intolerable
indeed.

Then in the early 1990s a new division emerged
within the Party of Islamic Tradition itself, as the
ruling elite under Rafsanjani sought to modernize the
Islamic state and to readjust it to the requirements of
globalization. That internal division did not lead to
popular mobilization, as the ruling elite succeeded in
containing the rift as an internal affair. The division
within the ruling parties and elites was intensified
from 1997, when the old Khomeinists came to power
and sought to democratize the Islamic state by
augmenting its republican aspects. That division led to
the political activation and mobilization of new
middle classes, the rise of new parties and violent
confrontation. However, from 2004 the core clerical
elite, led by the office of Leadership, sought to
minimize internal divisions by ousting the supporters
of modernization and democratization from power and
by creating new political formations and alliances,
especially the Party of Fundamentalism (Party of
Principles). The power bloc since 2004 has been
occupied by an alliance of the Fundamentalist and
Traditionalist-Conservative parties to the detriment of
the Reformists. Given the controlled nature of popular
elections in the country, the ruling factions have now
sought to retain their positions by what the reformists
regard as an electoral coup followed by repression.

But the real meaning of the aftermath of the June
election seems to me to lie in the unprecedented
intensification of a crisis of cohesion and unity. Such a
crisis had emerged and persisted in the 1980s under
[8]
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What is meant by an electoral coup is in fact a late
“political abortion” or an “abortive coup” preventing
the reformist baby from coming into life.
So on the whole I think developments since June 12
can be understood and explained in terms of a grave
crisis of elite cohesion and unity, which has not been
solved by arbitration as in previous episodes, but has
been met with violence and repression. Generally there
is little doubt about the vital importance of internal
divisions and opposition for change under ideological
regimes such as the Islamic Republic, particularly in
the absence of any organized external opposition.
However, the issue of disunity has not led to a crisis of
coercion and domination; there are no apparent rifts
within the armed forces, no rival military force, and
the ruling elite’s will to power and repression seems to
be intact. But crises of cohesion cause other problems
for ideological regimes, such as further undermining
regime legitimacy, paving the way for the organization
of popular discontent, and providing leadership and
ideology, as other necessary ingredients of a
revolutionary situation.
At any rate, the aftermath of the June election can be
understood in terms of the intensification of internal
divisions and polarization between ruling factions. But
unlike previous episodes, it has led to the mobilization
of popular opposition on a very large scale. The
highest degree of internal division in the regime’s
history has now been reached, causing polarization,
confrontation, and an expanding circle of “counterrevolution.”
DP: As you observe, never before in its 30-year
history had the Islamic Republic seen such mass
political mobilization. So why now, in your view?
HB: Obviously mass mobilization or the mobilization
of a large number of people for political purposes —
especially in a polarized form and under an
[9]

authoritarian regime — does not come about easily or
frequently; it is only rarely and under exceptional
circumstances that political leaders or parties succeed
in calling people onto the streets in huge numbers, as
happened for a few days following the June 12
election in Iran. Given this, we need to know what
those exceptional circumstances and conditions that
make mass mobilization possible are.
Since mass mobilization is a rare occurrence in the
politics of authoritarian regimes, it follows that its
outbreak cannot be explained by reference to
“ordinary” situations prevailing under those regimes,
such as economic problems and crises, government
incapacity, general mass discontent, or political
repression. Although these may constitute the eventual
ingredients of the mobilization episode, the
mobilization itself requires specific mechanisms in
order to come about; it is through these mechanisms
that those raw elements may be articulated. As the
history of mass mobilization shows everywhere, the
phenomenon is not a mechanical one, resulting from
some “objectively” undesirable socio-economic and
political conditions per se; it is the “subjective”
channeling of those objective conditions which is the
key element.
In general, three rather complementary theories have
been advanced in order to explain why and how mass
mobilization becomes possible: first the theory that
regards mass mobilization as a rare and exceptional
psychosocial or existential condition which results
from the development of an intolerable gap between
popular expectations and the possibility of meeting
them. From this psychosocial perspective, for
example, persistent poverty or persistent prosperity do
not lead to mass action; rather it is going from
prosperity to poverty or from poverty to prosperity that
creates the gap between expectations and the
possibility of meeting them. According to this famous
Davies J-Curve theory, collective action may take
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place at the point where the gap is most intolerable. So
the theoretical dispute and debate concerning whether it
is abject poverty or prosperity that leads to insurrection
is thus resolved. Another major theoretical debate has
been going on concerning whether mass collective
action becomes possible in a mass society or in a
society experiencing the development of a civil society;
this dispute is similarly resolved in the theory of
segmented civil society, according to which there is no
possibility for mass political mobilization in a repressed
mass society on the one hand, and there is no need for
such a mobilization in a fully grown and developed
civil society, on the other; so it is under conditions of
segmented civil societies that mass mobilization of the
type we have witnessed in Iran may come about. A
third, political, theory relates the possibility of mass
action and mobilization to internal ruling elite disunity.
In the specific case of Iran in June 2009, a combination
of these three factors made the large-scale mobilization
of the people possible.
First, an intolerable gap resulted from rising
expectations before the election and violent repression
after the election. The result was public indignation and
anger on an unprecedented scale. Obviously the rising
expectations were political in nature, not economic (as
in the theory mentioned above). For a few weeks, a
large, mainly urban middle-class-based socio-political
movement emerged around the two reformist
candidates (Moussavi and Karroubi), mobilizing a large
segment of the population in the name of the Green
Movement for reform and change. The period of the
electoral campaign was marked by festivities, public
discussions and gatherings, heated debates, hopeful
projections for change, intriguing TV debates between
presidential candidates, popular excitement, relative
press freedom, critique of government performance,
political publicity and propaganda, and the reactivation
of political groupings and parties.

As the unexpected election results were announced, the
atmosphere changed completely and a mood of public
despair and anger replaced the exuberant mood of hope
and expectation. The focus on a single issue — the
rigging of the election — polarized the population,
leading to mass street demonstrations against the
manipulation of the election. The first week after the
election witnessed the height of the gap mentioned
above. The leaders of the movement were also
successful in concentrating and focusing on the single
issue of fraudulence. The second week, however,
witnessed a rather different situation as the Supreme
Leader vowed, in the Friday prayers, to suppress any
street demonstration and endorsed the official election
results as accurate. So on the whole the gap resulting
from rising political expectations and hopes for
freedom and change, on the one hand, and the anger,
disappointment and indignation caused by the
manipulation of the election, on the other, was the
reason for the mass mobilizations which have had no
precedent during the 30 years of Islamic rule in the
country. In the weeks since, however, the sense of
anger has been gradually replaced by a sense of fear, as
the security forces have shown no sign of mercy in
ruthlessly and violently crushing any public gathering
or demonstration.
Regarding the second factor — the civil society vs.
mass society debate — I would argue that
developments during the so-called Reconstruction
Period from 1989 to 1997, as well as the Reform Period
from 1997 to 2005, had to a certain degree paved the
way for a slow transition from mass society to a
segmented civil society. The emergence of civil
associations, independent student organizations,
associations of writers and journalists, a rather
independent press and increasing independence of arts
and culture from government control were all signs of
this transition from mass to civil society, albeit in a
circumscribed way.
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A number of similar (though much more limited)
collective actions and mass protests had already
occurred during the Reconstruction and Reform periods
(like the uprisings in Islamshahr, Qazvin, Mashad and
the 1999 Student Uprising, known as 18 Tir), but the
recent mass mobilization was very different in nature,
scope, intensity of government reaction, and
particularly in terms of its consequences in disclosing
the real character of the political system for the
majority of the people. The violent confrontation took
place on a mass scale; the lines of division between the
government and the public opposition were clearly
drawn; and a state of disillusion came about. On the
other hand, it seems that the civil-society base of the
mass mobilization was not wide or strong enough to
sustain the opposition movement — though the role of
political repression has been much more decisive in
this regard.
Finally, the widening divisions within the ruling elites
and popular awareness thereof were highly effective in
generating the public outburst. Internal disunity took
place on a number of levels: first, despite sharp
differences between the ruling Fundamentalists and the
contending Reformists, the Reformist candidates had
been approved by the Council of Guardians; and the
Reformists obviously confirmed their allegiance to the
Constitution and the theocratic system; all this
(apparently) provided a margin of safety for the public
to come out on the streets and demonstrate in large
numbers; in this way they were supporting some of the
candidates and political figures who had, presumably,
been endorsed by the core clerical elite.
At a second level, emerging signs of division between
the Fundamentalist faction in power and the
Traditionalist-Conservative parties within the power
bloc (especially between Rafsanjani and the
Fundamentalists) generated the expectation (or perhaps
the illusion) that the Traditionalist-Conservative clerics
would actively support the Green movement; so the
[11]

perception was that the movement enjoyed the tacit
support of some Conservative parties who had become
disenchanted with the economic and foreign policies of
the ruling Fundamentalist faction. And finally, on a
third level, signs of some emerging divisions within the
ruling Fundamentalist faction, in parliament and
outside, and reluctance on the part of many
Fundamentalist MPs to support the current president’s
candidacy, might have been further encouraging for the
supporters of the opposition movement. Of course,
following the announcement of the election results, and
with increasing polarization of attitudes, some of those
more secondary rifts would disappear as the
Conservative and Traditionalist parties would rush to
the support of the government and the position of the
Supreme Leader at a time of deep crisis threatening the
very existence of the Islamic regime.
On the whole, although such an occasion for mass
mobilization had been dreamt of by the external or
even internal opposition groups for a long time, it had
not been planned in any way; rather, it was the result of
a rare political conjuncture — as is the case with
almost all revolutionary situations.
DP: The other night at a panel discussion on the
situation in Iran held in Chicago, the sociologist
Ahmad Sadri argued that we are witnessing the
“beginning of the end of the Islamic Republic.”(9) Do
you agree?
HB: In order to begin to think about any breakdown,
we need to know the consequences of the recent crisis
and confrontation for the political system; that is, we
need to ask what difference the recent developments
have made to the regime in terms of the eight various
analytical factors I laid out earlier. The consequences of
the recent crisis and confrontation are manifold; and we
need to assess the durability of the government in terms
of these consequences.

SOCIOLOGY OF ISLAM &
MUSLIM SOCIETIES
My general argument has been that if the political
system had previously experienced any sort of crisis, it
is now intensified and has gone through a qualitative
change. In terms of ideological legitimacy, the
preexisting deficit has now become a first-degree crisis
of legitimacy. The Islamic Republic claimed, from its
inception, to be at least partly based on popular support
and consent; one could argue that in the conception of
the Islamic Republic, “Republic” as the noun is more
essential than “Islamic” as the adjective of that noun
(at least in the Persian language this is the type of
perception we have about nouns and adjectives).
Elections have been held regularly and even the
Supreme Leaders have considered elections and
popular participation as a major basis of the political
system. Of course, as we know, elections in the Islamic
Republic are restricted in the sense that all candidates
in all elections have to be declared as qualified by the
Council of Guardians, which is the legislative arm of
the Supreme Leader. In any case, according to the
opposition, which enjoys a mass following, even the
institutionally restricted elections have not been
respected by the regime itself.
During the June election, all four candidates had been
endorsed by the Council of Guardians and indirectly
by the Supreme Leader; yet popular support for the
two Reformist candidates has increasingly been
regarded by the regime as counter-revolutionary, and
as we have seen, peaceful protesters have been beaten
and crushed for legally protesting against the official
election results. In the eyes of supporters of the mass
Green Movement, they had done nothing except
legally protest against the election results, but they
were treated ruthlessly and violently (even the Council
of Guardians itself admitted that on the basis of a
partial recount some three million votes had been
manipulated; and if a full recount had been allowed,

[12]

perhaps the allegations of the Reformist candidates
would have been corroborated). The Supreme Leader’s
endorsement of the official election results — even
before the partial recount, which he had himself
allowed — caused the sense of illegitimacy to spread,
in the eyes of the protestors and opposition, from the
government to the entire political system.
Furthermore, the Supreme Leader’s rather explicit
permission for the ruthless suppression of any
demonstrations, and their actual violent suppression,
further intensified the crisis and deficit of legitimacy.
If previously there was a second or even third degree
crisis of legitimacy, in the sense that the policies of the
government had faced popular objection, now with the
recent turn of events a first-degree crisis of legitimacy
has come about, throwing into question the legitimacy
of the entire system.
In terms of legitimacy, therefore, the recent
confrontation has had several consequences. Firstly: it
has somewhat exposed or uncovered the nature of the
power structure; previously the Supreme Leader had
been regarded (at least by the politically uninformed or
misinformed) as being neutral in factional rivalries and
as standing above the various factions like an impartial
judge; but this illusion was shattered by the Leader
himself when he announced that he had personal
political preferences and actually supported the current
government and policies and would endorse them at
any price. Previously there was a disagreement
concerning the role and position of the Supreme
Leader; some political activists and commentators
regarded him as politically weak or impartial;
accordingly, he did not have a base of social support
for himself, despite his great institutional powers, and
so he had to adjust to the policies of whatever
government was in power (Rafsanjani’s from 1989 to
1997 and Khatami’s from 1997 to 2005).
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But in fact, he had been trying to uphold his own power
and position; this had not been possible during
Rafsanjani’s presidency or during Khatami’s; but
Khamenei eventually emerged as the architect of a
fundamentalist alternative to reform and
democratization after 2004 by encouraging the
formation of the fundamentalist bloc which won the
various elections in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2008 and now
2009.
So the Leader’s own pronouncements and actions
demonstrated that he was the core figure and the real
coordinator. In terms of legitimacy, however, this was
not in his self-interest, as he removed all the mists of
illusion and put himself in direct confrontation with the
popular opposition. In a superficial sense, which is very
meaningful in the history of modern Iran, he was
moving from a constitutional to an absolutist sort of
velayat (rule). So, on the whole the recent confrontation
has made the power structure of the regime more
transparent for the general public.
A second consequence of the recent crisis and
confrontation is going to be a growing belief among the
ruling cliques about the disruptive nature of elections
and high popular participation; elections will be
considered disruptive; mass participation of the people
in elections will not be seen as an advantage for the
regime; if this is going to be the case, then the
legitimacy of the regime will be further undermined.
Thirdly, and in a parallel way, the people can be
expected to lose their belief in the value of voting and
political participation, which is yet another factor in the
erosion of political legitimacy. So in this way the
electoral aspect of the theocracy is going to be
discredited from both directions, and apparently the
regime will have to rely more heavily on the
undemocratic or clerical-aristocratic aspect of the
system.

A fourth outcome of the recent confrontation, which
should be taken into account in any assessment of the
future course of events, is the expansion of the circle of
“counter-revolution”; some hardliners are already
talking about the “new hypocrites” (referring to the
Mujahedin-e-Khalq, or MEK, which was ousted from
the political arena in the early years of the revolution
and which was labeled as the party of hypocrites).(10) I
think the most important impact of the current upheaval
and confrontation (which again has to be reckoned with
in any projection of the future) is the increasing
disappearance of the feeling of fear, which has been the
main basis of the political order; a feeling of courage to
express long pent-up grievances is the hallmark of the
current developments. As a rule, both on an individual
as well as a social level, anger kills fear; the
government did everything it could, in the span of a
few weeks, to make the general public angry, frustrated
and desperate. The “counting” of the votes, the
humiliating arrogance, the intimidation, the brutality,
the detentions, the violent repression, and so on, caused
widespread anger and indignation. If all the pent-up
grievances had been tolerated for years because of fear,
now anger caused by imprudent government action is
paving the way for a catharsis.
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Authoritarian regimes usually attempt to compensate
for the loss of ideological legitimacy either by
resorting to more coercive and repressive measures or
by turning to more public welfare services. In the case
of Iran after June 2009, what has happened is the
expansion of the coercive dimension or base of the
regime as a compensation for the legitimacy deficit.
This in itself means a transformation in the character
or type of the regime, which is becoming more
militaristic; a militaristic language is now utilized by
the armed forces in reference to the opposition
movement. This tendency is of vital significance for
the future course of developments, if the political
system is to remain in place. Given the prevailing
economic situation mentioned above, as well as the
limited managerial capability of the government, there
is little chance of success for any attempt at
compensation for the loss of legitimacy through the
expansion of the public sector and provision of
welfare; indeed, the system had already been suffering
from a crisis of efficient management.
Out of the four main bases of regime stability —
legitimacy, efficiency, elite unity, and coercive
capacity — it seems that only the latter has remained
functioning, at least for the time being. The unity of
the ruling elites of the Islamic Republic has also been
somewhat damaged. To be sure, factionalism, as
discussed above, had always existed among the ruling
elites. Interventionism vs. non-interventionism, socioeconomic modernization vs. adherence to tradition,
and Islamization vs. democratization have been some
of the major points of contention in the life of the
Islamic Republic over the last 30 years. But in a sense,
all these cleavages and rifts had been nonantagonistic; the significance of the recent
confrontation is that it has turned non-antagonistic
divisions and rifts into antagonistic ones. Several
moderate and reformist parties which had been
regarded as members of the family of the Revolution
are now being castigated as counter-revolutionary. The
[14]

unity of the ruling elites is being damaged as
antagonistic rifts are emerging, firstly between
Reformist and Fundamentalist parties, secondly within
the clerical institutions, and thirdly within the military
elite. More indications of increasingly antagonistic
rifts are emerging every day.
It seems that the Reformist parties are not to be
tolerated any more, as hundreds of party leaders and
members are being detained and imprisoned.(11) They
are already disqualified as illegitimate and counterrevolutionary parties; in fact it seems that political
party activity will become meaningless in the
emerging power structure; so the reformist parties will
definitely find themselves in an entirely different
situation and consequently will have to adopt new
positions, if they can continue to exist at all. The
Participation Front has been hit the hardest. There are
also some indications of growing division within the
clergy associated with the Supreme Leader and the
more independent-minded clerics in Qom, who have
tacitly or explicitly opposed the crackdown.(12) There
are even some signs of division within the
Revolutionary Guards; in the early years there were
some differences of opinion between the commanders
of the Western and Southern war fronts; following the
crackdown an open letter has been written by a
number of older commanders to the Supreme Leader,
questioning his endorsement of the election results
before full investigation and the violent repression of
the protest demonstrations. Still it seems that the
regime’s point of strength lies in its coercive capacity
and the unity of its coercive forces, at a time when the
legitimacy of the political system is coming under
question. So in responding to your question, the
strengths and weaknesses of the regime should be
taken into account.
Likewise, we need to take into account the state of the
opposition movement, its strengths and weaknesses.
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We need to consider the four factors in relation to the
opposition movement that has erupted. In analyzing
socio-political opposition movements, as already
mentioned, we need to examine the state of mass
discontent, the organizational network, the ideology
and the leadership of the movement. Concerning
popular discontent, historical experience shows that
potential mass dissatisfaction and discontent in
authoritarian regimes becomes effective when made
actual through a specific catalyst. Socio-economic and
cultural discontent must become politicized to have
political effects. What politicized all the pre-exiting
potential discontents was the issue of fraud in the
election as alleged by the opposition candidates
supported by a large popular movement. We have
already explained why and how public anger and
indignation was produced as a result of government
actions. Now all the grievances were finding a political
focus or epicenter; the annulment of the election was
the first public request, but as intimidation and
suppression followed mass demonstrations, a new
cause for anger and frustration was added to the initial
one, now targeting the leadership of the Islamic
Republic. The steam of general public discontent, as it
were, was now finding a political engine. Thus public
discontent was being organized into a specific public
demand. As we have seen, public discontent without
organization and mobilization leads to nothing. In
terms of organization, a quite adequate organizational
network (including the electoral headquarters, student
organizations, electronic means of communication, the
Internet and so on) has emerged and has proved
capable of providing the necessary rudimentary
functions. Of course the organizational capability of
oppositions has a converse relation to the coercive
capacity of regimes. In our case so far, government
coercion has almost demolished the organizational
capability of the opposition, but things are not going to
remain as they are now. For one thing, the
organizational capacity of the opposition is a function
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of its leadership. A number of people have emerged as
leaders, but as usually happens in such situations,
moderate leaders will be gradually replaced with more
radical ones. So far Mossavi, Karroubi and Khatami
have led the movement very cautiously and moderately;
on the other hand Ayatollah Montazeri has issued a very
significant statement justifying public rebellion against
the theocratic system and considering the regime as
already deposed because of its unjust and cruel
treatment of the protestors.(13) The gradual replacement
of more moderate by more radical leadership would also
mean an escalation in the ideology of the movement,
from questioning the election results to questioning the
very legitimacy of the whole power structure.
So two factors stand out as decisive in the outcome of
the turmoil: the coercive capacity of the government and
its ability and readiness to use it; and the leadership of
the movement and its ability and readiness to redefine
its ideological objectives and enhance its organizational
capability.
DP: Speaking of the leadership of the movement, some
have questioned whether it has any. What do you make
of this? Is Moussavi the movement’s leader, or is he
being led by the movement? To the extent that the
movement has a horizontal or decentralized structure, do
you view this as a weakness or a strength — or neither?
And what does this all portend for the movement’s
prospects?
HB: Usually, leaders of revolutionary or oppositional
movements can be classified into three main types:
ideologues; mobilizers/orators; and managers.
Sometimes all the three types may merge into a single
leader, but most of the time different leaders represent
the various types. Ayatollah Khomeini was both an
ideologue and a mobilizer/orator; but the management
of the movement was left to local leaders, as he was in
exile at the time. Lenin turned out to be a combination
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of the three types, as was Mao. In the case of today’s
Green opposition movement in Iran, the role of
leadership is not concentrated in one person, so the
three leadership functions are not performed. There is
no ideological leader, in the sense of grand
ideological schemes; it is more of a democratic than
an “ideological” movement; the aspirations of the
movement are clear enough and some of them can
even be traced back to the current Islamic
Constitution. Statements and pronouncements issued
by Moussavi and Karroubi as well as some highranking clerics such as Montazeri, Saanei and
Kadivar clearly indicate the movement’s ideological
aims.
Oppositional ideologies can be offensive or defensive
in posture. Revolutionary movements usually require
an offensive ideology, projecting a completely
different or novel socio-political order and structure,
whereas defensive ideologies usually present public
grievances or complain about the encroachment of
the regime upon the rights of the subject population;
defensive ideologies and ideological leaderships are
usually characteristics of “revolts” rather than
revolutions; peasant revolts, tax revolts, bread riots
and aristocratic rebellions are usually based on a
defensive ideology. We could call Iran’s Green
movement an “electoral fraud revolt.” The religious
revolt or rebellion of 1963 against the Shah’s policies,
led by Ayatollah Khomeini, was a defensive revolt; it
attempted to safeguard the Constitution against the
modernizing autocratic tendencies of the Shah. In a
sense, the current Green movement is rather similar
to the 1963 revolt, in that it is similarly a protest
against autocratic and militaristic tendencies and
repressive policies in the name of the existing
Constitution (although the repression now has been
much more brutal than it was then). Ayatollah
Khomeini had similarly asked for the proper
implementation of the Constitution. But a defensive

movement or revolt can turn into a revolutionary
movement, as was the case with the Puritan
Revolution in England and the American Revolution.
I think that the Green movement can resurrect the
ideals of the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, as
well as the aspirations of the early phase of the
revolution of 1979. And this would be good enough,
as the most fundamental political conflict and
cleavage in Iran since the end of the 19th century has
been that between autocracy (whether royal or
clerical) and democracy/popular sovereignty. To
become more offensive, however, the ideology needs
to be differentiated from the dominant theocratic
tendency in the constitution; and this is what the
current oppositional leadership seems to be rather
reluctant to propose.
More recently, however, the office of the Supreme
Leader has come under attack for carrying out
repression and engaging in illegal acts; two open
letters reportedly issued by the Association of
Previous Majles (Parliament) Deputies and the
Association of Qom Religious Teachers and Clerics
have blamed the Supreme Leader for what has
transpired since June 12 and have declared him
incompetent to continue as the Supreme Leader
according to the constitution. They have called on the
clerical Assembly of Experts to reconsider the
leader’s competence for leadership. If the Assembly
of Experts could gain some independence from the
office of the Supreme Leader and could represent the
clergy at large and exert control over that office, the
democratic aspect of the theocracy would be highly
enhanced; in that case, the independent members of
the clergy could emerge as the main leadership group
in a would-be transition from absolutist theocracy to
constitutional theocracy, or even to a pure and simple
democracy.
With regard to the second function — mobilization
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— given the state of repression, the current
opposition leadership is severely restricted; the
existing, rather weak civil society associations have
been further repressed and restricted. There is an
obvious connection between repression and
mobilization: with increasing repression, the chances
for mass mobilization decrease, as the cost of
political activity rises, while less repression on the
part of the regime, or more toleration — or at least
vacillation —encourages mass action. In the case of
Ayatollah Khomeini and his close associates in the
1978-79 revolution, political mobilization was
facilitated by the fact that they were in exile and
could easily call on the people to rise against the
regime and risk their lives in the face of repression.
But the current oppositional leadership does not
enjoy the same immunity. They are not ready to go to
the extreme in the face of severe repression. Finally,
the managerial structure of the leadership is not well
knit together, again because of repression. As a rule,
opposition leaderships in revolutionary movements
gain decisive importance and roles under two types
of conditions: first, when the state has more or less
lost its monopoly on the use of the means of violence
(as in the case of the English, Chinese, Cuban and
Nicaraguan Revolutions), and second, when the
regime is in a state of vacillation and hesitation vis-àvis the use of violence, and as a result the opposition
gets the opportunity to mobilize (as in the case of the
1979 Iranian Revolution). As we have already seen,
revolutions do not take place merely because there is
mass discontent and a large opposition movement
and a revolutionary ideology and leadership; they still
do not take place even if, in addition to all that, the
regime suffers from severe crises of legitimacy and
efficiency and unity. What usually sounds the death
knell for authoritarian regimes is a crisis of coercion
and domination. Obviously a strong and
ideologically-dedicated leadership can contribute to
such a crisis of domination and coercion, by

constantly enticing the public in the face of severe
repression and by resorting to all forms of political
campaign.
Finally, under the current circumstances I think that
the rise of a dissident cleric, such as Montazeri, at the
head of the movement, could make a great deal of
difference in terms of political mobilization and the
realignment of political forces and actors.
DP: Several parallels have been drawn between the
present events and those of 1978-79, the most
obvious being the mass street demonstrations and the
echoes of Allahu Akbar. In fact during the revolution
of three decades ago it took much longer — many
months — for the crowds to grow to the size we saw
within a matter of days in June 2009. On the other
hand, some argue emphatically that this is not a
revolutionary movement or situation, pointing to the
fact that the “Green Wave” phenomenon is bound up
with the presidential candidacy of a figure
(Moussavi) who was operating within the framework
of the Islamic Republic.(14) How do you view this?
As a scholar of the 1979 revolution, do you see
parallels between the two moments?
HB: To me it seems that the current confrontation
may well turn into a thoroughly revolutionary
situation, given the intensity of popular anger and
frustration and the humiliating way the government
has responded to it. But there are, as always, both
similarities and differences between the two
historical situations; and in any case there is no need
for the current confrontation to be an exact replica of
1979 in order to turn into a revolutionary situation; it
may do so on its own merits.
Now we can elaborate on the similarities and
differences in terms of the several theoretical criteria
we have already used to explain the nature of the
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situation. So first, in terms of a crisis of legitimacy, it
seems that the Islamic regime has been depleting its
own legitimacy from within, by violating its own
rules: the reformist candidates had been allowed to
stand for election but then peaceful protests on the
part of their supporters regarding the disputed results
are violently and brutally suppressed. The Shah’s
regime at the time was facing the opposition of an
outside contender in Khomeini, one who would
normally be repressed by an authoritarian regime. So
for such a regime, the Shah’s repression could seem
more “normal” (norms of repression) than the Islamic
regime’s repression, as it is repressing an opposition
which is an insider, or part of the family, as some say.
From another perspective, legitimacy has also
something to do with longevity and durability; the
imperial monarchy had been in place for 2,500 years,
whereas Islamic theocracy has been around only for
30 years. Obviously the institution of Persian
monarchy had been in a state of crisis since the late
19th century, leading to the Constitutional Revolution
(1906-1911), which provided a criterion for gauging
the legitimacy of the system, i.e. the Shah was to
reign and not rule, and the breach of the constitution
in this regard was a sure sign of the royal
government’s crisis of legitimacy.
A similar argument could be and has been developed
in the case of the Islamic Republic, in the sense that
the Sovereign Theologian (or Supreme Leader)
should stand above factional conflicts. However,
there is a great deal of difference between the
constitutions of 1906 and of 1979 in that the latter is
evidently not constitutionalist but absolutist: there is
no real separation of powers and the Ruling Jurist (or
Supreme Leader) has supremacy over the three
branches of government. So we cannot speak of a
deficit of legitimacy only in this very technical and
restricted sense, since the Ruling Theologian both
reigns and rules. This in itself, on the other hand, is

obviously in contradiction to the ideals of a popular
revolution which was supposed to restrict the power
of the ruler; and it points to the more general and
historical problem of legitimacy as far as the
theocracy is concerned. But there is a more mundane
sense of a legitimation crisis usually felt by the
general run of the people, and that is when instead of
persuasion, force is used to keep a people in its place;
and this is exactly the meaning of the crisis of
legitimacy as it is unfolding. The crisis of legitimacy
as a major ingredient of a revolutionary situation has
become grave.
A clear difference between the two historical
situations is to be found in the rulers’ will to
repression. The shah’s regime, after an initial period
of suppression, lost its will to power and gradually
shifted to a policy of moderation, toleration and
compromise: the Shah’s hearing of the message of the
revolution, the negotiations with the National Front,
the Bakhtiar regime, the Paris negotiations, the
Shah’s flight and so on; apparently the Carter human
rights policy and U.S. pressure (in the context of
differences of interest and opinion between
Washington and Tehran following the oil embargo of
1973) had something to do with the loss of the will to
repression. But so far the Islamic regime’s will to
repression has remained firm; maybe it is still too
early to judge, given the circular nature of
demonstrations and protests taking place every now
and then, in a fashion reminiscent of the events of
1978. In terms of U.S. –Iran relations, it seems that
the current administration’s approach may have
contributed to the will to suppression.
The decline or continuation of the will to suppression
is partly a result of the state of unity within the ruling
group; in the case of the Shah’s regime, elite unity
was in a sense damaged by the Carter human rights
policy, and the Shah vacillated between repression
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and relative toleration. As we have already seen, some
major signs of division within the ruling elite of the
Islamic Republic are also emerging. Once begun, such
divisions and rifts are hard to contain; they tend to
escalate and drag all political actors into the abyss.
Hence the current confrontation seems increasingly to
be creating a revolutionary situation.
Differences also exist in terms of the nature of the
opposition. In terms of popular discontent, a similar
pattern has occurred, a pattern I have already explained
in terms of the J-Cure theory. In the case of the Shah’s
regime, a long period of economic stability and growth
from 1962 to 1976 was followed by a sharp reversal
and downturn, creating an intolerable gap between
popular expectations and government capabilities. In
the case of the Islamic Republic, the same pattern has
come about albeit with a different content, which is not
economic but political: a long period of moderation
and relative toleration under Rafsanjani and Khatami
from 1989 to 2005 (the post-Khomeini period) was
followed by a sharp reversal and downturn under the
militaristic-fundamentalist regime of Ahmadinejad.
The specter of its repetition in June 2009 caused
widespread fear, anger and dread and led to the
confrontation.
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In terms of ideology, it seems that the current
confrontation is more specific in nature than was the
case with the slogan of “Islamic Republic” in 1978-9.
Indeed its specificity makes it non-revolutionary, since
(at least as far as the top leaders are concerned) its aim
is to annul the disputed election; however, as with the
early phase of the 1978-9 revolution, the moderate
opposition was calling for the implementation of the
constitution and a constitutional monarchy; obviously
it was the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini which
made the difference, calling for a complete revolution
— something the reformist leaders have not been
willing to take up; the most they have called for so far
is the holding of a referendum for endorsing or
annulling the election results (which has to be allowed
by the leaders of the Islamic Republic).
So, on the whole it seems that some of the ingredients
of a revolutionary situation have already come about
but some others have not (yet) materialized.
DP: What do you make of the responses of certain
leftists in the Western Hemisphere to the events
unfolding in Iran — from the likes of James Petras
defending the official election results and dismissing
any doubts about their authenticity as an imperialist
“hoax” to MRZine (the online organ of the venerable
socialist magazine Monthly Review) openly defending
Ahmadinejad as an anti-imperialist to Hugo Chávez
embracing Ahmadinejad as a “revolutionary” ally and
the Foreign Ministry of Venezuela denouncing the
Iranian street demonstrations:
The Bolivarian Government of Venezuela expresses its
firm opposition to the vicious and unfounded
campaign to discredit the institutions of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, unleashed from outside, designed to
roil the political climate of our brother country. From
Venezuela, we denounce these acts of interference in
the internal affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
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while demanding an immediate halt to the maneuvers
to threaten and destabilize the Islamic Revolution.(15)
It’s important to note that there have been strong
critical responses from others on the Left to such
statements — those of Reese Erlich, Hamid Dabashi,
Saeed Rahnema, the Campaign for Peace and
Democracy, and others.(16) What is your impression
of these contending positions?
HB: To me it seems that such unfavorable reactions to
the popular movement in Iran are not hard to explain. I
think they result from three factors: first, ignorance of
and misinformation about the nature of the political
system in Iran since the Revolution, the various
historical phases it has gone through and the widening
gap between official ideology and public opinion,
particularly the rapid secularization of society under
the theocracy; consequently such regimes end up
being more popular among some foreigners than
among their own people. Secondly they result from
financial and commercial self-interest and the special
favorable commercial relations Iran has with some of
the countries mentioned; obviously they think more of
their own national interests than the interests of the
Iranian people. In my opinion, analyses resulting from
such positions and interests are not much worth
discussing from an academic point of view.
Ideological regimes tend to create their own satellites
or close friends, who obviously endorse their policies
and actions. Here we can add Islamist parties and
organizations in the Arab world and their ideological/
commercial ties with the Islamic Republic. Thirdly,
such analyses result from the analysts’ attachment to
and use of obsolete theoretical and conceptual
frameworks, divorced from current developments
(what Ulrich Beck calls “zombie categories”); as a
result, they accept demagogical positions at face value
and confuse Fascism with Socialism.

I think that the leftist responses you have mentioned
have forgotten all about the democratic dimensions of
Marxism and have fallen prey to demagogy in this
case. They sometimes forget that the extreme Right
and the extreme Left deceptively look alike. In the
case of Venezuela, a combination of pseudo-leftist
appraisals and commercial interests have been at
work. The Venezuelan government knows nothing
about the political situation and public opinion in Iran,
which is increasingly turning against the foreign allies
of the Islamic Republic. Russia’s support has already
brought about chants of “Death to Russia” from
protestors on the streets of Tehran.
Regarding more theoretical responses, I would say that
the type of class analysis applicable to the case of Iran
in a long-term sense is very different from the type of
class analysis usually applied in a short-term sense.
From a long-term historical perspective, the main
social conflict has been taking place not among the
social classes belonging to one social formation, but
between those belonging to two social formations:
pre-modern and modern. The historical meaning of
various political developments in Iran should be
understood in terms of this underlying conflict: the
Constitutional Revolution signified the victory of the
social classes of the modern formation over the social
forces of the traditional/pre-modern formation. In its
own peculiar way, the absolutist state structure of the
Pahlavi regime further strengthened the modern social
formation (albeit in the framework of modernization
from above under a dictatorship). The traditional
social forces made a comeback after the revolution of
1979 and imposed the traditional political-cultural
pattern of elitism, authoritarianism, patrimonialism
and cultural order, discipline and obedience under the
rule of a theocracy. With the subsequent development
of the modern formation and its social forces,
advocating the ideas of citizenship, political equality,
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democracy, popular sovereignty and socio-cultural
freedom (as partly seen in the Green Movement), the
underlying contradiction between the world of
coercively-reconstructed tradition and the democratic
path is bound to come to a head, as we are witnessing
now.
DP: There are discordant views among progressives on
whether the Obama administration should move
forward in engaging Iran at present, given the
circumstances. Some progressives — particularly
Iranians — argue that the U.S. should hold off for the
moment on engaging Iran; Karim Sadjadpour of the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace recently
gave expression to this view:
For the first time ever, I think we shouldn’t even
be talking about engaging Iran, we should take a
wait and see approach. The strategic imperative
to have relations with Iran will always remain,
but let’s wait until the dust settles in Tehran. ...
By prematurely calling for engagement I think
we run the risk of demoralizing the opposition
and the millions of people who took to the
streets and who continue to reject the legitimacy
of the Ahmadinejad government; we implicitly
endorse an election that is still being hotly
contested in Tehran and tip the balance in favor
of the hardliners.(17)
Others — particularly in the American peace movement
— call for engagement and diplomacy regardless of the
post-election aftermath. Thus Reza Aslan, author of
How to Win a Cosmic War: God, Globalization, and the
End of the War on Terror, recently argued that one
must not ignore the dramatic opportunities for
long-term change in Iran that have emerged as a
result of this crisis, opportunities to which the
international community must respond through
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a confident and coherent policy of
engagement. ... [A] concerted dialogue with
Iran ... will offer moral and political support
for the genuine expression of the will of the
Iranian people at a time when the regime’s
authority is at an ebb. Most important, it will
offer Iranians hope. ... if the West keeps
talking to Iran, it can empower its citizens to
change their society from the ground up, and
to influence those who have the capacity to
act from the top down.(18)
What is your view on this question?
HB: I am definitely in agreement with those arguing
against engagement. I too think that engagement
would in a sense grant legitimacy to a regime
confronting a very deep crisis of legitimacy, on the
one hand, and would alienate a democraticallyinclined and growing opposition movement, which
expects moral support from all democratic nations,
on the other.
I think that now is the worst time for the U.S.
government to pursue a policy of engagement, as the
regime in Iran is at its worst; it should have tried
when the Iranian regime was at its best, that is during
the Khatami presidency (of course the Iranian
fundamentalist groups were opposed to it at the time).
As we all know, rational decision-making in general
and in the field of foreign policy in particular should
take many factors into account — the current
political environment, reactions of other decisionmakers, intended and unintended consequences,
among others — and not just react to the policies of a
previous rival administration. One specific factor
which needs to be taken into account in this case
(regardless of the issues relating to regional and
international security) is the impact on the Iranian
democratic opposition in the shorter as well as the
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longer run.
Although the Iranian government’s perception that no
threat now comes from the U.S. under the new
administration (unlike its perceptions following the
invasion of Iraq) may have made it feel more
comfortable dealing with and suppressing the
opposition movement recently, and the government
may have thus indirectly benefited from the new
foreign policy orientation in the U.S., any
engagement policy would definitely (and this time
directly) embolden the government vis-à-vis the
democratic opposition, which would be another
instance of a familiar foreign policy pattern
particularly common during the Cold War era. We all
remember the case of British and American support
of the regime of South Africa and its Apartheid
system during the Cold War, which played a part in
stifling the anti-Apartheid movement and which
endorsed the apartheid regime. On the other hand, the
new western foreign policy towards South Africa that
was gradually adopted towards the end of the 1980s,
with the end of the Cold War situation, contributed to
the weakening of the Apartheid regime and
encouraged the anti-Apartheid movement. More
generally as a rule, if democratization gained pace in
many parts of the world in the 1990s, it was partly
due to the abandonment of the security-based western
foreign policy supporting all sorts of regimes opposed
to the Eastern bloc. More precisely, it was not active
support for the democratic oppositions, but rather
disowning the non-democratic regimes, that
contributed to the transitions. In the case of Iran-U.S.
relations, the U.S. government has already
experienced a similar episode, when it gradually
withdrew its support from the Shah’s regime and thus
encouraged the anti-Shah opposition.
DP: I’d like to close by discussing your intellectual
biography. How would you locate yourself on the

intellectual-political map? What are, and have been,
your main theoretical reference points and
influences? There are strong Gramscian flavors in
your book State and Revolution in Iran, which you
wrote as a doctoral dissertation under the supervision
of Ernesto Laclau. Has Gramsci continued to
influence your thinking? Has Laclau? How would
you characterize the arc of your outlook over the last
three decades? How have your views changed over
the course of time?
HB: I studied the Marxist literature on political
sociology at the University of Essex where Ernesto
Laclau and Bob Jessop taught me. I was and have
remained interested in many aspects of the politicalsociological ideas of Marx, Gramsci, Poulantzas,
Laclau and Barrington Moore, and I have used them
in my works. Later on I developed an interest in the
work of Michel Foucault and his analysis of power,
and I have used some aspects of his ideas in my more
recent works. I have always considered these thinkers
as building blocks for political sociology, an area still
under construction. More recently I have focused on
the political sociology of democratization, especially
with reference to the Middle East.
DP: What occasioned this shift in your thinking from
a largely Marxist frame of reference to a more postMarxist/Foucauldian one?
HB: I considered Foucault’s work on discourse and
power as a culmination of Marx’s understanding of
ideology and power; somehow they seemed akin, but
Foucault’s provided a wider scope for application.
Danny Postel is the author of Reading “Legitimation
Crisis” in Tehran: Iran and the Future of Liberalism
(2006) and a Contributing Editor of Logos: A Journal
of Modern Society & Culture.
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The secularization thesis has dominated in social
science for more then a century (Klein Goldewijk
2007: 30). The idea was that the role of religion
would decrease due to modernisation (Philpott 2002:
81). This thesis disregarded the cultural and historical
foundations of religion in many societies, but time
showed that people didn’t stop believing nor that
religious organizations would cease to exist. But Iran
shows that religious actors are as vibrant as ever.
Although now scholars say the number of political
religious actors increased after 9/11, in Iran religion
has played a political and social role since the 15th
century.
Background of the Shi’ism
Shi’ism is rooted in a political movement in the 7th
century Arabia (Eickelman 2002: 256). The principle
Shi’i belief is that succession must be granted to the
son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammed, Ali or his
descendents. The Safavid empire (1501-1722) made
Shi’ism the state religion in Iran and eliminated other
forms of Islam (Lapidus 2002: 242). The Safavids
also created a state-controlled Islamic bureaucracy.
As a result the Ulama became a strong social
network.
After the fall of the Safavids in the 17th century, the
Ulama was liberated from state control (Lapidus
2002: 244). The Shi’i scholars challenged the
legitimacy of the Shah as the primary bearer of
Shi’ism, just like Khomeini questioned the Shah’s
legitimacy.
The Ulama asserted that religious

scholars bore the highest religious authority. During
the Qajar dynasty (1779-1925) the Ulama
increasingly grew stronger (Lapidus 2002: 469).
Religious actors kept playing a role to defend their
own interests in the Constitutional Revolution
(1906-1911), the oil nationalization movement of
Mossadeqh (1950s), and the Islamic revolution
(1977-1979) (Mansourian 2007: 219). According to
Lapidus ‘the struggle between the Ulama and the
state, was a principle feature of Iranian history [for
200 years]”(Lapidus 2002: 469). But the religious
establishment didn’t only oppose the shah, they also
played a vital role in the countermovement that lead
to the failure of the opposition (Mansourian 2007:
221). The Ulama were primarily concerned with
limiting the power of the Shah and the secular
opposition and followed their own class interests
(Mansourian 2007: 219).
Religious agents in the revolution
Before the Islamic revolution there was a strong link
between the bazaar in Teheran (merchants) and the
Ulama. The Ulama depended on contributions of
bazaar merchants, and the Ulama gave the merchants
legitimacy in the business world (Mansourian 2007:
220). As a result the Ulama supported the bazaar
merchants, when the central authorities tried to limit
their power.
In 1953 Mossadeqh was overthrown (Lapidus 2002:
480). The restored regime of Reza Shah ruled as a
secular dictatorship and launched modernization
programs to increase state power. This resulted in
active hostilities of the Ulama, bazaar and
intelligentsia who opposed the growing power of the
shah, his dependence on foreign support and the
created economic hardship for the peasantry and
lower middle classes (Lapidus 2002: 481). The
ultraliberal market reforms marginalized both the
Ulama, bazaar and secular civil groups.
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The opposition was easily crushed by the Iranian
regime, but the Shah couldn’t beat the Ulama’s
resistance to the state, which was provoked by land
reforms. In 1962 Mehdi Bazargan said that the
collective struggle for a better society was the role of
the custodians of Islam (Lapidus 2002: 482). Dr. Ali
Shari’ati created a new reform movement which saw
shi’ism as a form of religious protest, which also
inspired the militant leftwing Islamic Mojahedin-i
Khalq.
In 1971 Ayatollah Khomeini formed the concept
velayat e-faqih, which meant the control of the state
by the religious establishment (Lapidus 2002: 483).
He became the symbol of protest against tyranny. In
1978 the government newspaper criticized Khomeini,
which resulted in the closure of the Bazaar and unrest
(Mansourian: 226). In the 1970s the number of
religious and non-religious protests were growing
because of bad political and economic conditions.
Eventually the Shah fled the country, while the army
did nothing (Lapidus 2002: 484).
Masses of Iranians had been mobilized by a coalition
of religious and liberal leaders under the guidance of
the highest Iranian religious authority, Ayatollah
Khomeini. The revolution came in the name of Islam
and not a secular ideology as socialism. Victorious
militant clergy transformed Islam as the idiom of the
insurgency into Islam as object of the revolution.
In the beginning the Ulama agreed to compromises
with other social groups and democracy (Mansourian
2007: 227). But later few religious figures who
opposed Khomeini’s concept of velayat e-faqih on
religious grounds couldn’t get public support and
were crushed. Ayatollahs Taleqani and Shariatmadari
were marginalized. Former socialist, liberal and
minority nationalist allies were mostly executed or
fled.
Religious opposition against the Islamic republic
Later the Islamic leftist group Mojahedin-I Khalq
became one of the most important opposition groups

against the republic and the religious Sunni leader of
Iranian Kurds in that time, Ezzedin Husseini, stated
that “many governments in the past have claimed to
act in the name of Islam, but in reality they were not
Islamic. The Safavid and Ottoman governments were
cases in point; more recently we have the case of
Khomeini in Iran. They are queshri – backward and
vulgar-and have ruined Islam and its spirit. What we
have is not religious government, but a dictatorship
under the name of Islam. In Sunni Islam there is no
imam as political leader or na'ib (deputy) imam. The
role of the clergy is to be morshed, or guide, in
knowing God. You will also find some Shi'i clergy
who reject Khomeini's concept of faqih. It is not an
Islamic regime.” (Olson 1984: 924).
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Mansourian (2007: 228) agrees that there is clerical
resistance. He says the new dominance of the Ulama
over the state destroyed the grassroots support of the
bazaar and elites for the Ulama. As a result they
became an apparatus of control and not an popular
instrument of resistance. Mansourian says, that
although it’s still a minority, a dissident religious
class is rapidly growing in number and popularity
among the elite, to resist the Velayat-e Faqih and to
establish a democratic system of government. An
example he says, is the liberal president Khatami who
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lead the government for a short time, but was
marginalized by more Islamic conservative forces.
During Mohammed Khatami’s rule between
1997-2005, there was a government based on more
liberalism, openness and reforms.
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The rise of the Green movement
In 2005 the hardliner Ahmadinejad came to power
and the ‘reform era’ ended. During the recent
presidential elections on June 12 2009 he was
challenged by the reformist Mir Hussein Mousavi, but
officially he still won. The opposition claimed the
election was rigged, but the victorious candidate
Ahmadinejad disputed this. The demonstrations
against the election results in June, on Jerusalem day
(last day of Ramadan) which is meant as a day to
support Palestinians, the 30th anniversary of the U.S.
embassy on 4 November were all covered in the green
colour of Islam. Green was the campaign colour of
Mousavi. One of the popular methods of the proMousavi supporters was going on the top of their
roofs to shout “Allahu Akbar” (God is greatest). This
is one of the methods of protest used by those who
took part in the 1979 revolution.
According Mehdi Khalaji (2009), the opposition front
runners, despite being lauded as modernizers,

Mousavi, Khatami and Karroubi are deeply loyal to
the ideals of Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, the
founder of the Islamic Republic, and advocate a
theocratic political system. This in contrast to the
young men and women in the streets, who aim to
bring down the very system of which their leaders are
part. But even the young demonstrators use Islamic
symbols.
It also lead to a ‘reformist’ tendency among some
members of the Ulama. Ayatollah Motazari, who was
the deputy of Ayatollah Khomeini, until a dispute
between them led to Motazari being sidelined and
eventually forced out of Iran’s power elite, have
recently resurfaced as a spiritual symbol of the
reformist movement, says the Kurdish opposition
politician Loghman H. Ahmedi (2009).
Concluding remarks
The ‘reformists’ as well as the hardliners legitimate
their political claims with Islam. Both the green
movement leaders and the hardliners are loyal to the
Islamic revolutionary foundations of Iran. This
loyalty to the Islamic state shows the vibrancy of
Islamic actors in Iran and disapproves the
secularization thesis. Although the secularization
thesis predicts an end to religion, in Iran religion is
alive as ever and will continue to play a role in the
political system of Iran. Therefore an end to Islamic
republic is unlikely. Even if the protests of the Green
movement are not completely focused on Islam,
Islamic actors will continue to play an important role
in Iran.
*Wladimir van Wilgenburg studied Turkology and a
Journalism and New Media Minor at Leiden
University and is now studying International
Relations at the University of Utrecht. Van
Wilgenburg writes freelance articles on the Middle
East (Jamestown Foundation, Today’s Zaman and
other magazines) and is an English editor of the
Kurdish newspaper Rudaw, based in Erbil, Iraq.
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The elimination of national origin quotas in
immigration policies increased the flow of
immigrants to the United States from Asia, Latin
America, and the African continent. As a result, new
questions have been raised about how non-European
immigrants are incorporated in the United States and
how they come to understand and construct their
identities in the United States. In my research, I
focused on the children of Iranian immigrants who
migrated to the United States following the hostage
crisis of 1979.
Iranian-Americans are uniquely
situated immigrants within the larger population of
immigrant groups given the context of global politics
that surrounds their identity.
The context of
incorporation and belonging for Iranians is embedded
in the political tensions between the Iranian regime
and the United States that has spanned over the last
three decades, and the focus on global terrorism
following the events of September 11th. Through my
in-depth interviews and the subsequent analysis I was
able to illustrate that second generation Iranians
utilized three particular narratives to understand their
Iranian background and situate themselves as
Americans.
Immigrant narrative: becoming American by
losing “Iranian-ness”
The first narrative that emerged was grounded in the
classic immigrant story. The first subtopic within this
narrative encompassed the immigrant success story.

Within this framework, American society was
perceived as the “land of opportunity” in which the
“American dream” could be achieved.
With
resilience, hard work and good work ethics
immigrants can achieve upward mobility and
ultimately become incorporated into U.S. society.
Second-generation Iranians utilized the lived
experiences of their parents and extended families in
order to illustrate the possibility of achieving the
American dream. Thus for them, as long as they
worked hard enough and “pulled themselves up by
their boot strings” then the “American dream” was
widely open to them. This framework also allowed
some of the participants to look down upon other
immigrants and minority groups who had not
achieved upward mobility. Thus, some segments of
the American population had either not wanted to
succeed or had not worked hard enough. Among my
interviewees it was apparent that they fully believed
in the notions of individualism, equal opportunities,
and eventual success in America. For them, success
was defined as monetary mobility and financial
stability. Second-generation Iranians in my sample
were quite optimistic and fully invested in the
“American dream,” which is indicative of their
indoctrination into the American ethos.
The second subtopic within this larger narrative was
centered on certain Iranian societal/interactional
styles such as “taroff,” which is most commonly used
when guests are visiting another’s home. However, it
is not exclusively limited to these social affairs;
rather, it is also utilized during everyday interactions.
This interactional style can take the shape of a back
and forth offering between two or more people in
which one person offers something and the other
person is supposed to decline what is being offered.
Ultimately, the recipient of the offer usually accepts
what is being offered.
Among my respondents
“taroffing” had to be modified in order for secondgeneration Iranians to feel that they belonged to,
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American society. The interviewees were cognizant
that “taroffing” created a certain degree of culture
clash with their American friends and co-workers.
However, at the same time, some of the respondents
felt that “taroffing” was an important aspect of their
Iranian identities and that those Iranians who did not
engage in this interactional style were looked upon
negatively by the wider Iranian community. Thus,
ultimately, these behaviors had to be altered when
interacting with Americans because for non-Iranians
“taroffing” may be an indication of having low selfesteem, being fake or too modest. For many of the
respondents “taroffing” was culturally appropriate
with other Iranians or in Iranian social settings;
however in public these types of interactions would
remain hidden.
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The Persian Empire
The second narrative that emerged was centered on
the Persian Empire and it was primarily utilized as a
means to create distance from the current Iranian
regime and the controversies surrounding it. Within
this narrative, I uncovered two subtopics. First, the
history of the Persian Empire and its glories were
used by second generation Iranians to create cultural
and regional superiority over other Middle
Easterners. The persistent images entailed the history

of Persia, its mighty kings, and the vastness of the
Persian Empire. Thus, the countries that surround
Iran were argued to provide no match to Iran’s rich
history or that of the Persian people. Some of the
participants seemed to harbor some resentment
towards Arabs and Saudi Arabia because of the
invasion that converted the majority of Iranians from
Zoroastrianism to Islam. This resentment was more
complex when respondents coupled it with feelings of
moral and cultural superiority over other Middle
Easterners, which was frequently contextualized with
statements about the “uniqueness” of Persians.
Furthermore, it became clear that there were benefits
for second generation Iranians to label themselves as
“Persian” instead of “Iranian.” First, they could
distance themselves from the negative connotations
of Iran in the western imagination.
For my
respondents the term “Iran” brought forth images of
the Iranian revolution of 1979, the Iranian hostage
crisis, the Islamic republic of Iran, the “Axis of Evil”
speech by President Bush, and most recently the
Nuclear Proliferation stand-off between the United
States and Iran. In comparison, the term “Persia”
conjured up images of exoticism, Persian cats and
carpets, and may sound more “beautiful.” Second, by
labeling themselves “Persian” second generation
Iranians could avoid or at least bypass some of the
direct discrimination that the “Iranian” label might
create. This allowed them to cover their ethnic/
national identities, however the extent to which these
mechanisms work in escaping marginalization and
discrimination are questionable and remain to be
seen, yet they indicate the attempts of my respondents
to come to terms with their marginality in U.S.
society.
Race and Whiteness
The third narrative that I uncovered dealt with the
racial classifications of second generation Iranians
and their perceptions of whiteness. The first subtopic
within this narrative explored the struggles that
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second generation immigrants have in their attempts
to come to terms with their racial and ethnic
classifications in the United States. Most of my
respondents felt that the U.S. Census’ classification of
Iranians into the white race category was appropriate.
Most of my respondents saw themselves as racially
white, but ethnically Iranian. However, there was
some confusion about how race is related to
phenotypic features, such as skin color and eye color.
Some of the respondents felt that they had a “typical”
Iranian nose, which they perceived signaled to
Americans that they are Middle Easterners and not
white.
In this regard, Iranians who displayed
“typical” Middle Eastern or Iranian features such as
darker hues of skin and “distinct” facial features had
more difficulties blending in with the mainstream,
and consequently stood out compared to other
Iranians of different phenotypic features.
The
interviewees persistently tried to understand the
official placement of Iranians into the white race
category, while dealing with their “not quite white”
status.
This issue of racial and ethnic classification became
more complex and multifaceted when the linguistic
origins of “Iran” were interrogated to show that its
linguistic roots were tied to “Arya,” which was
argued to mean “land of the Aryans.” Throughout
this argumentation it became obvious that the
respondents’ desires to be perceived and accepted
into the white race category were directly tied to them
not being perceived as dangerous and irrational
“Middle Easterners.” The inherent contradiction is
that groups, including Iranians, who are seen as
“potential terrorists” or “Islamic fundamentalists” by
the mainstream media and the U.S. government are
simultaneously categorized as “white.” This was at
the heart of the discussions that took place within the
narrative of race and whiteness. The extent to which
second generation Iranians can position themselves as
racially white is questionable considering the global

politics that complicate their identities in the United
States. These complications have been addressed by
the scholarship of Portes and Rumbaut (2001), Ansari
(1988), and Mostofi (2003), who underscore the
complexities that pertain to “whiteness” and racial
classifications for second generation immigrants of
non-white descent.
In my sample, I found that
Iranians in the United States aim to classify
themselves as white due to the positive connotations
and potential benefits that are associated with the
white race category. However, they attempt to do this
by avoiding ethnic and social associations with other
Middle Easterners. Iranians aim to place themselves
within the white race category without accepting the
Middle Eastern racial category. This rejection of
Middle Eastern groupings creates social distance for
Iranians from populations that are seen as being
“dangerous” in American society.
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Conclusion
The narrative themes that were employed by my
interviewees were used as a means to counteract the
negative dominant discourses that are perpetuated
about Iranians and Middle Easterners in wester n
societies. Thus, it is clear that some participants in
my interviews utilized the immigrant narrative about
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upward mobility to illustrate their equal standing with
mainstream Americans, as a way to signal that the
Iranian cultural heritage also values independence
and individualism. The narratives about the Persian
Empire and its rich history were critical in positioning
Iran as a civilized and progressive nation, which was
viewed as superior to other Middle Eastern nations.
Lastly, the contradictory narratives about race
illustrate the subjects’ anxieties about racial
classification in the United States. This anxiety was
heightened when the Middle Eastern classification
was conceptualized as a racial category, because this
is the classification that my interviewees attempted to
distance themselves from, due to the global politics
that are assigned to it. In order to achieve this social
and political distance some participants engaged in a
discourse about the “Aryan race” and Iran as being
the true “land of the Aryans.” Second generation
Iranians are invested in these narrative themes in
order to incorporate and belong to American society.
Iranian-Americans occupy a unique position that is
situated in the larger context of global politics.
Therefore, the narratives that this population utilizes
in understanding their Iranian background while
attempting to become American is embedded in the
conflicts and hostilities of the last 30 years between
the Iranian regime and the United States.
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Censorship in Iran is greatly pervasive even today,
which makes it very difficult for Iranians to access a
wide range of accurate information about everyday
news. This is an important issue because the media is
a means of giving a voice to the people. Freedom of
the press often means unveiling the conduct, errors
and failures of governments and presidencies. With
liberty of thought and speech, people share opinions
and ideas, which can become more powerful than
arms and can threaten rulers. Freedom of speech is
also a basic civil right, essential to preserving peace
and order, and without which it is hard to understand
and resolve differences of opinion. In this article, I
examine the situation of the writers, namely their
freedom of expression, social and human rights, and
their experiences with censorship in Iran before and
after President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to
office. An important part of my paper will be about
blogging which has grown extremely quickly due to
the fact that print media can no longer meet the needs
of writers and readers due to strict censorship and
extreme punishments for not complying with the law.
Censorship under the current President of Iran,
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has put the print media into
a state of a coma—unconscious and waiting to
awaken. Iranian journalist Arash Sigarchi, recipient of
the 2007 Hellman/Hammett award for writers who
have suffered political persecution, writes in his
article “Jail for Journalists”: “Toward the end of
Mohammad Khatami's term (1997-2005) and the
beginning of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's
administration (2005-present), the Ministry of
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Information and Security, Iran's intelligence ministry,
began to summon all newspaper journalists to ask
them to cooperate with the system. Their message
was clear: Those who cooperate can work; those who
do not will go to prison. Those who cooperated with
the regime received economic privileges. Some of my
former colleagues chose to accept the regime offers
and today hold positions of power.” (Sigarchi)
Freedom of expression and association came under
attack throughout the years as a result of flagrant
flaws in the administration of justice, coupled with a
deeply politicized judiciary system, according to
human rights watchdog organization Amnesty
International and its 2005 annual report. Journalists
faced politically motivated and arbitrary arrest,
prolonged detention, unfair trials and imprisonment.
The laws used to arrest and imprison journalists,
relating to defamation, national security and
disturbing public opinion, were vaguely worded and
at variance with international standards. (Egendorf
61-62) The human rights watch group also states that
Taqi Rahmani, Alireza Alijani and Hoda Saber,
intellectuals and writers associated with the National
Religious Alliance (Melli Mazhabi), remained
arbitrarily detained without any prospect of release.
For over a year, the court where they had lodged their
appeal refused to issue a verdict. (Egendorf 62)
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The following cases of journalists’ and writers’
experiences of their freedom of expression in Iran,
reveals the mechanisms through which censorship is
exercised in the country. In one of its issues, the
Economist talks about the closure in 2007 of the daily
newspaper Shargh by the Ministry for Culture and
Islamic Guidance. Shargh published an interview
with Saghi Ghahreman, a “counter-revolutionary”
Iranian poet living in Canada, who Iran accuses of
promoting homosexuality. The Shargh paper had only
just returned to the streets after being banned in 2006
for cartooning President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as a
donkey. It was one of a handful of liberal papers to
have fitfully survived the clampdown that followed
his election in 2005, which signaled the end of the
reformist period under his predecessor, Muhammad
Khatami. Another reformist paper, Ham Mihan, was
closed in July, shortly after reappearing from a sevenyear ban. Last month Emadoldin Baghi, a former
editor of Jomhouriat, was jailed for three years for
"activities against national security" and "publicity in
favor of the regime's opponents". (Economist) A court
last month sentenced Adnan Hassanpour, a journalist
from the now closed Kurdish-Persian weekly paper,
to death on charges of endangering national security
and propaganda against the state. (Economist) In his
article “Can Iran Change?” Anderson reveals the sad
story of Zahra Kazemi, an Iranian-Canadian
photojournalist, who was arrested while taking
pictures outside Evin prison. She died after nearly
three weeks in custody. Initially, the authorities
claimed that Kazemi had suffered "a stroke" and an
"accidental fall." A Defense Ministry doctor, who
later fled to Canada, said that he had examined
Kazemi four days after her arrest, and found that she
had been raped and beaten; several of her fingernails
had been pulled out and her skull was fractured. Amid
an international outcry, an intelligence agent was
charged with her "quasi-intentional murder." He was
acquitted when the authorities ruled her death an
accident. (Anderson)

During a session of the U.N. General Assembly in
New York, someone asked about Iran's crackdown on
academic freedoms and the media, writes Anderson.
"You see, in Iran, the freedom is a very privileged
freedom," Ahmadinejad replied. "Just as you'd arrest
a man for traffic violations, there must be social
laws. . . . We have to become clean human beings.
Man has to keep moving along a sublime
path." (Anderson) Because transgressing the
censorship laws in Iran can even be fatal, many
journalists prefer to exercise self-censorship in order
to avoid facing the harsh repercussions ranging from
long unemployment to possible death. This has
created a situation unique to the Iranian culture of
censorship. Both social and self-censorship have
become an extension of physical power, now they
branch into the realm of controlling the mind and the
spirit. In this way, censorship plays a crucial role in
gaining and securing power in Iran.
As in China, where the Internet is having a profound
impact on political discourse, the Internet in Iran is
challenging the Islamist regime’s ability to control
news and shape public opinion, particularly among
Iran’s well-educated younger generation. (Berkeley
71) According to Bill Berkeley, an author and a
writing professor at Columbia University’s School of
International and Public Affairs, in his article
“Bloggers vs. Mullahs: How the Internet Roils Iran”
the first web-blogs in Farsi were established in
September 2001. There are now more than 75,000
blogs in Farsi with Farsi being the third most
frequently used language in the blogosphere, behind
only English and Chinese. (Berkeley 72) The Iranian
Internet has its roots in the short-lived flowering of an
independent press in Iran that followed the election of
the reformist President Mohammed Khatami in 1997.
Some of the prominent Iranian journalists during that
time used blogs to bypass strict state censorship and
to publish their work online. Exiled Iranians
worldwide use blogs to communicate with those
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still at home in Iran. (Berkeley 72) President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has one too, though he
almost never posts, explains author Sarah Elton. Jon
Lee Anderson in his New Yorker article “Can Iran
Change?” clarifies, his blog is called Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad's Personal Memos, in which he
expounds on God, philosophy, and his childhood, and
answers e-mails from readers. The signature videos
for his 2005 Presidential campaign were two thirtyminute productions that expertly portrayed him as a
man of the people. In one scene, Ahmadinejad is in
line for lunch at a self-service canteen; in another, he
walks among the poor.(Anderson )
Unsurprisingly, many Iranians write blogs
anonymously, yet some prominent bloggers still write
under their own names. One is Bijan Safsari, former
editor and publisher of several pro-democracy
newspapers that were shut down over the last several
years. “At a time when our society is deprived of its
rightful free means of communication,” he blogged in
February 2004, “and our newspapers are being closed
down one by one—with writers and journalists
crowding the corners of our jails...the only realm that
can safeguard and shoulder the responsibility of free
speech is the blogosphere.” (Berkeley 72-73) In his
fascinating new book “We Are Iran: The Persian
Blogs”, which chronicles the rapid growth of the
Iranian blogosphere the young Iranian journalist
Nasrin Alavi quotes one blogger writing in November
2004, “I keep a weblog so that I can breath in this
suffocating air.... In a society where one is taken to
history’s abattoir for the mere crime of thinking, I
write so as not to be lost in my despair, so that I feel
that I am somewhere where my calls for justice can
be uttered.... I write a weblog so that I can shout, cry
and laugh, and do the things that they have taken
away from me in Iran today.” (Berkeley 72)
In recent months, Iran’s blogoshere has faced a new
setback. Iran now has one of the world's most
sophisticated Internet censorship systems with filters

blocking access to all sorts of sites, including an
Iranian site: hoder.com. All ISP subscribers must sign
a contract promising not to access "non-Islamic"
sites, and a bill passed recently restricts access to
high-speed Internet. (Elton) This is the reason why
many Iranians who choose to be politically involved
in their country, immigrate abroad where they enjoy
safe freedom of expression but at the price of being
away from their homeland and relatives. Hossein
Derakhshan (of hoder.com), according to Sarah
Elton’s article “Blogging for a Revolution”, is the
godfather of the Iranian online democracy movement.
In Toronto, Derkhshan has a second life as a Web
designer, with clients in Canada and Europe, but over
the past two years, he has spent a lot of time overseas,
conference-hopping and networking with others
working for online democracy. He credits Canada
with politicizing him. "If I had not left Iran, I would
not have discovered blogs and become political," he
says. "If I were there now, I would have to leave."
Having already been detained once, he dares not
return. (Elton)
Iran has found another important and remarkable way
to use the Internet. Twitter, with its 140 character
limit and its cult of immediacy, has emerged as a key
source of news and updates from Tehran. (Morozov
12) Roused by the declaration that Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad had won the presidency in a landslide,
incredulous voters took to the streets. Using Twitter,
thousands of Iranians sent micro-messages to the
outside world, like: “Confirmed. Army moving into
Te h r a n a g a i n s t p r o t e s t e r s ” s o m e w i t h a n
accompanying photo or video link. Twitter’s ad
slogan “What are you doing?” took on new meaning
once the Iranian government cracked down on
protesters and constrained journalists. (America 4) It
is, indeed, a great shortcut to viewing the photos,
videos, or text updates from the Iranian streets that
resurface on our favorite blogs a few hours later.
(Morozov 12)
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Thousands of Iranian young people may now want to
experiment with Twitter and see what it has to offer,
embracing it as a useful tool to generate and spread
views critical of regimes like Ahmadinejad’s.
(Morozov 14) According to Alec Robinson, the
author of the ABC News article “Iran powerless to
stop revolution by proxy”, students in Iran are
bypassing Iranian censorship in an effort to preserve
their basic personal freedoms such as the right to
assemble. Even though banned, the social networking
sites such as Twitter and Facebook, can be accessed
through a proxy site “where you can view a site
within the site—hiding what you’re really looking
at.” (Robinson?) All over Iran, students are using
these proxy websites and servers to send images of
the protests to the outside world and using it to keep
in touch with one another. The young Iranians also
use these sites to download illegal Farsi rap, which is
critical of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
(Robinson)
What seems to be the most interesting aspect of
contemporary Iranian politics is the juxtaposition of
post-revolutionary dynamics and democratic
processes generated out of a political stalemate or
gridlock. (Fahri 169) This inevitably reflects on the
situation of the print media and the writers in Iran. An
important event is the so-called press revolution,
which occurred in the midst of the presidency of
Khatami from 1997 to 2005 when for a couple of
years the journalists and writers got to taste the true
freedom of speech. With the election of Mohammad
Khatami, which itself was a reflection of the highest
level of elite competition the Islamic Republic had
seen since its inception, an open press season was set
loose. In a span of less than one year, the number of
publications throughout the whole country reached
850 (561 of which started between 1997 and 1999).
The first professional organization pursuing the
interests of journalists, the Association of Iranian
Journalists also began operating in the fall of 1997.
(Fahri 154) Competitive politics influenced the rise of

competitive press. The interaction of these dynamics
became highly explosive after Khtami’s election,
when the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance,
now controlled by the pro-reform faction, began
giving licenses to an increasing number of daily,
weekly, and monthly papers throughout the country.
(Fahri 154) Shortly after Khatami’s assumption of
the presidency, the Islamic reformers in the press
managed to establish the Union of Journalists.
(Afshari 204)
The appearance of the newspaper Jame’eh (Society)
in 1998 signified a new phase in the struggle for the
right to freedom of opinion, expression, and the press.
Jame’eh began with a circulation that exceeded by far
those of the semiofficial daily papers, sometimes
reaching up to 300,000 copies. (Afshari 204-205) The
daring language of the newspaper was a claim to a
total independence from the established order.
Jame’eh opened up a hidden world to a reading
public thirsting for something more than official
pronouncements, clerical sermons, and scripted
rallies in support of the establishment’s domestic and
foreign policies. It broke taboos and challenged the
notion of the red lines, the vague no-go areas
comprising the fundamental political, religious and
social spheres of the hard-line clerics who dominated
the system. (Abdo and Lyons 162) “One can criticize
the decisions of an Islamic government” and still
remain a good Muslim, a lengthy interview with a
leading intellectual cleric assured readers. In the same
issue, the front page featured a picture of the French
actress Juliet Binoche, with her hair fully exposed in
contradiction to Iran’s Islamic dress code. (Abdo and
Lyons 162) “We did not respect the so-called red lines
because they were man-made, “recalled Jalaiepour,
one of the founders of Jame’eh. Jalaiepour soon
began to keep a packed kit bag, including a
toothbrush and a change of underwear, at his side in
case he was hauled off to jail without warning. “Some
conservatives say that the red lines came from God,
but we did not believe this. For example, before and
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Jame’eh you could not see pictures of women on the
front page…every newspaper put the supreme
leader’s speeches on the front page, but we used to
cover it on page two… We were avant-garde for the
time, but originally we just wanted a newspaper to
protect democracy, tolerance, things like that.” (Abdo
Lyons 159) Other new, popular publications included
Sobh-e Emruz (Said Hajjarian’s daily), Rah-e Now
(Akbar Ganji’s bi-monthly), and Khordad (Abdolla
Nuri’s daily). (Afshari 205) Even more popular was
the column written by the witty Sayyid Ibrahim
Nabavi, which appeared in Jame’eh, Tous, Neshat,
Asr-e Azadegan, and Arya. (Afshari 207)
The relative freedom of expression in 1998-2000
allowed the reformist press to initiate a rational,
journalistic discourse, implicitly validating many of
the charges of violations that almost everyone within
the regime denied previously. (Afshari 207) The
terminology and political analysis, most notably the
notions of civil society and the rule of law, were
unleashed on a receptive and restless public. Jame’eh
newspaper, and its broader promise of grassroots
democracy, pluralism, and freedom of expression,
had to be stopped. (Abdo and Lyons 165) Eventually
the hard-liners used their influence within the
judiciary system and other administrative systems to
revoke the daily paper’s publishing license for
allegedly undermining religious and revolutionary
values. (Abdo and Lyons 165) Tous was the successor
of the banned Jame’eh. In its debut editorial, the
founder of the newspaper wrote, “Tous seeks to
safeguard human rights and general freedom, and to
revive the forth pillar [of democracy].” (Abdo and
Lyons 165) The newspaper was eventually shut down
and its founders, license holder and the popular
satirical columnist Ebrahim Nabavi were rounded up.
(Abdo and Lyons 166)
The attack on Tous revealed the old dynamics at work
in reference to the freedom of expression and the
press. The attacks were initiated politically and
outside of the judicial process by the powerful hard-

liners in the security network. (Afshari 209) One
hard-line cleric said publicly the editors faced
possible death sentences for “fighting against God.”
This charge, although rarely applied in practice, was
among the favorite tactics of the conservative
establishment, which sought recourse to its own
reading of Islamic law to crush any hint of dissent.
(Abdo and Lyons 166-167) Just a few hours after his
rhetorical assault on the pro-reform press, Khameini
convened a meeting… to draw up arrest warrants for
the top five people at Jame’eh. (Abdo and Lyons 168)
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The fact that Khameini did this reveals much about
the importance all sides place on the issue of free
expression under the Islamic political system. The
leader’s intervention also revealed the fundamental
weakness of the Iranian press and its inability to serve
as a keystone of a new, civil society within the
Islamic political system. (Abdo and Lyons 194) Since
around 2000, the hard-line “conservatives,” as they
are called, have successfully crushed the reformists,
not just by shutting down the reformist press but by
vetoing reformist legislation and disqualifying
thousands of electoral candidates, and jailing,
torturing and in a number of notorious incidents,
assassinating reformists and student activists.
(Berkeley 73)
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Brothers Manuchehr and Akbar Mohammadi, and
Ahmadi Batebi, who were among the young students
detained, tortured and sentenced after unfair trials
following student demonstrations in 1999, they
continued to face violence while in custody. Six years
after the murders of two political activists and three
writers—a case known as the “Serial Murders” no
steps have been taken to bring those who ordered the
killings to justice. (Egendorf 63) Nasser Zarafshan, a
human rights defender and the lawyer for the families
of the two political activists, remained incarcerated
following an unfair trial in 2002. (Egendorf 64)
Journalists and human rights defenders Mahboubeh
Abbasgholizadeh and Omid Me’mariyan were
arrested for a period of several weeks…possibly in
connection with their Internet writings and the
support they had given to independent nongovernmental organizations. Many of other civil
society activists faced harassment through summons
and interrogation. Those detained had “confessed”
while in custody although later [they] reported to a
governmental commission that these “confessions”
were extracted under duress. (Egendorf 64-65)
Though enlightened, elegant, and dapper, President
Khatami thoroughly disappointed his supporters.
Ultimately, he was unable, or as some would say
unwilling, to implement the reform programs for
which he was overwhelmingly elected. (Gheissari
130) A young student blogger wrote in January 2004
about Khatami, who time and again failed to stand up
for student demonstrators who were jailed and beaten
on his watch: “It’s unfair to say that he [Khatami] did
nothing. We got concerts, poetry readings, carefree
chats in coffee shops and tight manteaus [the
mandatory overcoats for women]. But is this all that
my generation wanted? It was also during this time
that the students of my generation were labeled
hooligans and Western lackeys...and again Khatami
was silent.” (Berkeley 73)
Iran’s hard-liners wield real power through nonelective institutions like the judiciary, the so-called

Guardian Council, which can veto legislation and
disqualify candidates for elective office, and the
army, the Revolutionary Guard, and allied militias
like the Basij and Hezbollah. Any foreigner who
visits Iran is struck by the gap between the image
projected by the regime to the outside world and the
reality of Iranian society. The blogs quoted here
vividly convey the bitter disillusionment many
Iranians feel not just toward the hard-line mullahs,
but toward the failed reformist project and its
erstwhile leader, Mohammad Khatami. (Berkeley 73)
Despite the sentiment that Iran is no place to be a
journalist, gay or even a woman, I also noticed a
simmering optimism that change will come one day.
The point is perhaps best expressed by Emadeddin
Baghi, a leading journalist and human rights advocate
who spent three years in prison: “Society itself, not
the government, creates change,” Baghi wrote “And
there are deep transformations occurring in Iran. Out
of sight of much of the world, Iran is inching its way
towards democracy.” (Berkeley 78)

Photojournalist: Sasan Afsoosi - safsoosi@gmail.com
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Before the Iranian revolution on 1979, Iran and
Yemen’s relations were dominated by the Shah’s
policy toward its regional allies. The Shah supported
the Yemeni royalists against the republican forces in
Yemen’s civil war that lasted from 1962 to 1970. At
the time, there was an Egyptian-backed coup d’état in
Yemen during Gamal Abdel Nasser’s leadership,
against royalists backed by Saudi Arabia. Yemen was
divided into North and South, but after the war, North
and South Yemen declared unity in 1990. In 1994,
another war started between the central government
in Sana’a and Yemen Socialist Party (YSP), who were
fighting for the secession of southern Yemen, but
were defeated.
Despite Yemen’s military support for Iraq during the
Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, bilateral relations were
not strong during the first two decades of the Iranian
revolution, but a shift in Iranian policy toward the
Arab world resulted in stronger ties with Yemen. In
recent years, a number of high-level meetings took
place between the two countries’ officials stressing
cooperation. One sign of this was seen in 2003, when,
following Iran’s request for the participation in the
Arab League as an observer, the Yemeni foreign
ministry announced it support noting the fraternal
cooperation between the Arab and Islamic states."2
In 2007, the Yemeni ambassador to Tehran submitted
Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Saleh’s message to
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, that Tehran-Sana’a relations
are strong, and was anxious to expand relations with
Iran. Iranian officials also referred to the friendly
relations between the two states and called for an
expansion of mutual ties.3

In May 2009, at a meeting between the country’s
foreign ministers, Iranian Manouchehr Mottaki told
his Yemeni counterpart, Ali Muthana Hassan, “The
Islamic Republic of Iran is always committed to the
consolidation of its friendship and deepening of its
ties with Yemen.”4
Nevertheless, the relationship soured when Yemen
accused Iran of arming the Shia Houthi militia and
aiding them in intrastate attacks. In September 2009,
President Ali Abdallah Saleh revealed in an interview
with Aljazeera that Iran had secretly offered him its
services as a mediator with the al-Houthi, an
indication that Iran already had connections with the
insurgents.5
Tensions increased when armed Yemeni rebels
engaged in incursions across Saudi border, triggering
a strong Saudi response. There were accusations of
Iran’s military and financial support for the Houthis
though. Yemeni officials also admitted the Houthis
are financed by several non-governmental Shia
groups other than the Iranian government.6 In
October 2009 Yemeni officials seized an Iraniancrewed vessel containing weapons near the Houthi
stronghold in the north.7 Still, US official deflected
claims of evidence of Iran’s military assistance to
Houthi rebels.8
In March 2007 there was a demonstration in Tehran
outside the Yemeni embassy protesting the
"massacre" of Shiites in Yemen. The protesters
demanded the closure of the embassy and expulsion
of the ambassador.9
Despite Iran’s awareness of the scope of Saudi
Arabia’s influence in Yemen, Iran continued to
expand its presence within the Shia community in
that country. Yemen has repeatedly accused Iran of
attempting to create a Shia state in north Yemen,
while Iranian officials have blamed the Yemeni
officials of discriminating against the Shia minority.
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In response, Yemeni officials have cited Iran’s dismal
human rights record as the reason it should stop
interfering in Yemeni affairs. An official Yemeni
response came from Yahya Salih, Yemen’s chief of
security, who dismissed claims by Manouchehr
Mottaki as being baseless. 2
At the height of the rhetorical war, Yemen renamed
Iran Street in the capital of Sana'a after Neda Agha
Soltan, who was shot dead during post-election
demonstrations in Iran. In retaliation, Iranian officials
have designated a street in Tehran, The Martyrs of
Sa'ada, after the remote and mountainous Yemeni
province where Shia insurgents are battling
government forces.
According to Saudi-owned al-Arabiyya TV, another
road in Tehran was recently renamed after Hussein
Badreddin al-Houthi, a rebel leader killed in the
fighting. In the past, renaming a street in north Tehran
to Martyr Khaled Islambuli, the army officer who
assassinated Egypt’s president Anwar Sadat was a
serious barrier in Iran-Egypt diplomatic relations.3 4
On November 25 2009, Yemeni demonstrators in
Sana’a appealed to the government of President Ali
Abdullah Saleh to sever relations with Iran. Similar
demonstrations took place in Tehran in support of the
Houthis.5
Despite the tension, during a meeting with his
Egyptian counterpart, Ali Larijani, Iran’s Parliament
Speaker, criticized Saudi Arabia for its role in
Yemen’s internal dispute.6 "In Yemen issue, we
criticized our Saudi brothers not the Yemenis", said
Larijani in Cairo and reiterated Iran’s readiness to
resolve the crisis in Yemen.7
The evidence of Iran’s support of the al-Houthi is
mostly based on Yemeni government claims, but the
al-Houthis’ Shia identity and their ability to fight six
wars against the government since 2004 suggest that
they must have substantial foreign support.

Iran-Saudi Proxy War:
Iran’s ambitions and influence following the Iraq war
have deepened tensions with Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
and the Persian Gulf countries, and highlighted the
old Shia-Sunni divide. These issues point to a shift in
Iran’s policy after the Iraq war, and its view that no
regional enemy poses a serious security threat.
The Iran and Saudi rivalry are reflected in Yemen.
Both countries have supported proxies in Iraq,
Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. Iran’s
support for the minority Shia who are under attack
from both Saudi and Yemeni forces does not sit well
with the Saudis. But the Islamic Republic of Iran has
always sought the opportunity to expand presence
beyond its borders and portray a strong image,
especially in the aftermath of the disputed elections
and the spreading internal turmoil.
Relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia have not
been friendly in the past few years and became more
antagonistic following the recent clashes in north
Yemen. The contentious relationship hit new heights
when Shia rebels crossed over to Saudi Arabia.
On the Iranian side, several articles in hard-line
newspapers such as Kayhan and Fars conducted
interviews with a Houthi spokesman and wrote in
support of the Yemeni Shia.8 In most news pieces, the
Saudi army is called the aggressor and the Houthis
are portrayed as successful defenders of Yemen.9
The Iranian media outlets, including Press TV, alAalam, Iran’s Arabic language TV station, have been
taking a pro-al-Houthi position since the beginning of
the sixth war, which began in August 2009. They
frequently host Yemeni opposition figures and accuse
Saudi Arabia of participating in the war in Yemen.
Most notably, Manouchehr Mottaki warned against
foreign intervention in Yemen’s internal affairs. “We
strongly warn the regional countries to be careful and
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vigilant. Certain people add fuel to some crises
should be assured that the fire will entangle them.”
said Mr. Mottaki.2
The latest came from Mahmoud Ahmadinejad when
he was addressing the people of the city of Ahwaz
"Saudi Arabia was expected to mediate in Yemen's
internal conflict as an older brother and restore peace
to the Muslim states, rather than launching military
strikes and pounding bombs on Muslim civilians in
the north of Yemen.” Ahmadinejad criticized Riyadh
for not using “its military weapons against Zionists to
defend Gazans” during the Israeli 22-day war in Gaza
in January 2009. In response, the Saudi Foreign
Minister Saud al-Faisal denied any Saudi
involvement in military attacks against the Yemeni
Shia fighters, "I don't know where he got this
accusation that the kingdom is waging war on the
Houthis. The real accusation is that Iran is the one
that meddles in Yemen's internal affairs." al-Faisal
said in Riyadh.2
Despite the threat of al-Qaeda to both Iran and Saudi
Arabia, Iran has made connections with al-Qaeda
when it deemed beneficial. Iran’s connections to alQaeda are to advance its regional goals, hurt
American interests, and to work against the Saudis.
The Shia in Iran are not in good terms with the
Wahabis and several statements from Qom are a
testimony to that.3 But Iran’s hegemonic foreign
policy intentions dictate such connections.
The history of the Islamic Republic and Wahhabism
has been an unfriendly one. The father of Iran’s
revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was
unalterably opposed to Wahhabism and to the House
of Saud, which adopted that particular strain of
Sunnism as the state religion of Saudi Arabia. Indeed,
Khomeini often used the term “Wahhabi” as a
pejorative in reference to the Saudi ruling family.

Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda organization has taken
Wahabism a step further in the direction of
justification of violence—regardless of the death and
destruction wreaked on innocent bystanders—to
inflict harm on real or perceived enemies of Islam.
Oddly enough, bin Laden and the Islamic Republic
share a common enemy in the Saudi ruling family—
an enemy against whom they have been unable to
make common cause.
The Shia Factor:
The conflict with the Shia tribesmen has been going
on for years, but has been more intense since 2004.
Branded as the home of the bin Laden family, Yemen
has a religious conflict between Shia tribes, and proal Qaeda Wahabi Sunnis. The Shia fighters are
followers of Shia Islamic radical cleric Hussein alHouthi.
In 2005, nearly a thousand troops and tribesmen died
in a battle near the Saudi border.4 In 2007, Yemen's
president ordered a crackdown against rebels,
accusing them of trying to oust his government and
impose Shia religious law.5 In the same year, the
Yemeni Ministry of Defense published a fatwa on its
website authorizing and obligating the use of deadly
force against the Believing Youth, a small band of
Shiite Zeydi rebels that has been battling the
government on and off since 2004.6
The Houthis belong to the Zeydi sect of Shia Islam at
odds with the predominant version of Shiism
practiced in Iran known as Twelver Shia, the official
religion in Iran. In recent years, religious centers in
Qom have provided fellowships to Zeydis in Yemen
so they can convert to Twelver Shiism. Shia cleric,
Hussein al-Houthi, leader of the Houthis who was
killed in 2004, was known for being close to Qom
clerics. The relationship between Ayatollah
Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, to Hussain
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Houthis, was cosidered deep, and almost as friendly as
the leader’s relationship to Hezbollah’s leader, Seyyed
Hassan Nasrollah.23
Many Shia web sites and forums have condemned the
discrimination against the minority in Yemen.2
Amnesty International’s 2009 report on Yemen showed
a grim picture of human rights in that country,3 and
warned that Yemen’s response to al-Qaeda may cause
an increase in human rights violations against
government critics.4 Iran has called for an end to the
discrimination it claims has been ongoing for years.
Iran has also accused the Saudis joining the Yemeni
government in its crackdown on the Shia since August
2009.5
It is natural for the Iranians to support Shia factions and
minorities with a history of repression around the
globe. But the Iranian regime has proved that it only
supports groups that enhance its sphere of political and
military influence and authority. The Iranian regime’s
intentions are more political than emotional. As seen in
the past, the IRI takes side in political disputes based
on political alliances. The IRI took the side of Armenia
over Muslim Azeris and kept quiet in Russia’s
Chechnya and China’s Uyghur conflicts. IRI’s support
for the minority Shia in Saudi’s Eastern Province,
Bahrain, and Yemen is perceived to have political and
strategic motives, rather than ideological ones.
Terrorism:
Recently, the top State Department counter-terrorism
chief warned that al-Qaeda turning to under-governed
nations like Yemen and Somalia to plan and conduct
terrorist operations.6 Yemeni government is also
troubled by the growing al-Qaeda presence7 8, a weak
government, and civil conflict. Al-Qaeda’s attempt to
hide in politically unstable or failing states makes
Yemen a favorable spot. The closure of the US and
British embassies sounded the alarm that Yemen is the
new terrorism hotspot. Despite Yemen’s membership in

the United Nations, the Arab League, and the
Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Nonaligned Movement, the country has had no luck with
national unity and terrorism.
The conflict in Yemen has created an internal tension
between the Sunni central government and the Houthis
in the north, and sporadic years of insurgency have
claimed hundreds of lives and ensuing domestic
conflict and instability and chaos that al-Qaeda needs
to operate. The Saudis see a threat on their southern
border while the Iranians contentedly watch events
attempting to divert attention from their own
neighborhood. In a sense, the fight ----------between
Sana’a and the Houthis has created a security vacuum
in which al-Qaeda has taken advantage to establish
itself in Yemen.
Several strategic elements have caused this conflict to
find regional dimensions. Al-Qaeda’s presence in
Yemen, Iran’s presence within the Shia community in
the north, Saudi Arabia’s historic influence and
proximity, and US interest to combat terrorism have all
made Yemen a strategic crossroad. Overall, with both
the Houthi and the al-Qaeda threat alive in Yemen,
prospects for national reconciliation are grim. It is
apparent that insurgency, lawlessness, the cash and
weapons flow from foreign countries and, declining oil
reserves make Yemen a fresh front on the fight against
terrorism.
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Iran has for centuries been a territory coveted by
many and understood by few. The Iranian
consciousness is one of deep appreciation for its
national heritage, myths and heroes. Recently Iran
has dominated headlines over its nuclear development
program and created stumbling blocks for world
leaders attempting to contain and engage an
aggressive regime in Tehran. Iran today stands on its
own as a force demanding attention and respect from
the world. With its massive deposits of natural
resources and geo-strategic importance, Iran is trying
to position itself as a regional hegemon and provider
of energy to countries like Russia and China.
Preceding Iran's current place in the world has
been a journey as dramatic as any nation in
contemporary history. The 1979 Revolution saw the
birth of a unique and contrarian system of
government: the Islamic republic. Ever since, Iran has
struggled to define itself, its goals and its leaders.
This struggle continues today with the neoconservatives of Iran playing power politics not just
with the reform movement that dominated the late
1990's and early 2000's but also with a traditional
conservative party struggling to stay relevant. Both
the election of Ahmadinejad and the ascension of
Iran's neo-conservatives have had repercussions felt
by all levels of Iranian society. In the following both
the fall of the reform movement and the electoral
victories of the neo-cons in 2005 as well as Iran’s turn
to Russia and China for economic and political
opportunities will be discussed. First, the origins of
Iranian neo-conservatives and their experiences in the

Iran-Iraq war that shaped the movement will be
reviewed with respect to these developments.
Within Iran, neo-conservatives are known
Osoulgarayan (Principlists) which is a generic term
covering a range of conservatives. The official name
of Ahmadinejad’s party is Abadgaran Iran-e-Islami
(Developers of Islamic Iran). In academia and within
the world of political punditry, Iran’s political parties
are often categorized as either ‘left or ‘right’. This
oversimplification can cause confusion to foreign
observers as the simplicity implied by these terms
don’t do justice to the complexity of Iranian political
life. The neo-conservative movement in Iran bloomed
out of the rot of the conservative establishment.
Conservatives in Iran had lost significant electoral
ground to the reform movement and its leader
Mohammad Khatami. A new conservative element
sought to distance itself from the corrupt,
establishment elite and be reborn in populist terms
and they borrowed heavily from the reform
movement itself. Equality, Islam and nationalism
were the rhetorical weapons the new conservatives
would use to advance their agenda.
This new movement to break off from the
failing conservatives would come from the “war
generation” (Takeyh). Ahmadinejad’s party, for
exmple, is highly driven by the revolutionary ideals
they embraced under Ayatollah Khomeini and fought
for during the grueling eight years of war with Iraq
(1980-1989). Many members of this new
conservative movement are veterans of the Iran-Iraq
war and it is that conflict that gives context to the
neo-conservative ideology. The eight year war with
Iraq began in the feverish aftermath of the 1979
Revolution. Although conscription was used in the
later years of the conflict, volunteer enlistment made
up a bulk of Iran’s armed forces. The Iran-Iraq war
might be viewed as a battle of ideologies in which
Iranians were called to sacrifice.
Saddam Hussein’s secular Ba’athist regime
promoted pan-Arabism. Iraq and Hussein stood in
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stark contrast to Iran’s Shi’a brand of theological
government that was intent on exporting its
revolution to all Muslim nations. The war became an
opportunity to consolidate and legitimize the
revolutionary regime and to win the war would serve
as the ultimate validation of Khomeini’s theocratic
vision for Iran. Volunteers for the war came largely
from a deeply religious and poor segment of Iran’s
society. Upon returning to society, they were
dismayed at what was seen as a departure of
revolutionary ideals and an embrace of Western
culture by the wealthier segment of the youth. The
young and rich of Iran were largely unaffected by the
conflict (Takeyh).
As the war ended in the late 1980’s, the
Iranian Republic found itself in a precarious state.
Although coming out intact, Iran was a deeply
wounded and traumatized nation. Iranian casualties
were an estimated 500,000 and the charismatic
architect of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, died
the year after the war’s end in 1990. Additionally,
domestic issues had been largely sidelined during the
length of the war. It was time for Iran to focus on
civil and economic concerns that had been put on
hold since the 1979 Revolution. The role of leading
the domestic transition from a state of war to a stable
nation state would be left to Hashemi Rafsanjani.
Rafsanjani reflected a practical conservatism
that operated within the clerical establishment to
which he belonged. His strong ties to the mercantile
elite where he had flourished in the pistachio trade
provided hi support from some of the wealthier
segments of Iran. These close ties to the clerical and
trade classes made him an ideal leader to put the
pieces back together domestically. Rafsanjani would
however approach Iran’s economic development by
doling out state projects through informal and opaque
dealings where cronyism often trumped merit. This
along with the lack of government regulation fueled
an environment of short term thinking and
opportunism. Foregin investors came to Tehran in the

hopes of an open economic environment receptive to
long term investments. The lack of transparency and
accountability in business dealings would deter
foreign investment in the long run. It quickly became
apparent that the rich were getting richer. Ordinary
Iranians began to resent the growing stratification of
wealth in their society, however, because of his
connections with the clerical class and the fact that
this class often benefited from the economic climate
encouraged under Rafsanjani, religion was used to
pacify the population.
Into his second term, Rafsanjani would begin
to lose his clerical support and at the same time, a
moral liberal reformist movement began to pressure
Rafsanjani for serious democratic reform. Hardliners
began to balk at Rafsanjani’s moderate positions and
as the conservatives fought, the reformers organized
(Ansari M). A charismatic leader emerged in
Mohammad Khatami whose service to Iran and
international experience made him an ideal candidate
to reach out to the West. Khatami had served in the
military although his service was under the rule of the
Shah, not in defense of the revolution. He also ran the
Islamic Centre in Hamburg and studied Western
philosophy. Khatami had a pragmatic approach to the
West that reflected his experience. In 1997, Khatami
was elected to the presidency by an overwhelming
majority of Iranians. He immediately began to
formulate strategies to change Iran’s foreign policy
and reach out to the international community. His
tactics centered on cultural engagement attempting to
break the social constructions he saw as ruling
international relations; particularly the mythology
surrounding US-Iranian relations (Ansari M,
Confronting Iran).
Great strides were made under Khatami in
opening Iran’s foreign policy and furthering debate
domestically about the future of Iran. Notions about
the legitimacy of religious rule were being openly
questioned and debated. Many began to wonder
whether the Velayat-e Fqaih was responsible for the
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day to day business of the state. Scholars like Mohsen
Kadiver where scrutinizing the constitution and
calling for evaluation and clarification. However due
to the large expectations put on reformers and their
inability to enact substantial, lasting reform the
movement lost momentum. In 2004, the conservatives
came back with a vengeance, criticizing Khatami and
his allies for his strategy of rapprochement with
nothing to show for it (Ehteshami and Zeiri). A year
later in 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won the
presidency of Iran.
Ahmadinejad came from humble roots as the
son of a blacksmith who purportedly sold his house
giving half the sum to charity and buying a more
modest house. His family moved to Tehran from the
small town of Aradan when Ahmadinejad was the age
of one. His simple beginnings would later come to his
aid as he fashioned himself a man of the people
(Ehteshami and Zeiri). As a young man Ahmadinejad
was a member of the IRGC. His service record
remains uncertain but it’s been reported that he served
with the Basiji, one of Iranian paramilitary security
forces (Kukis). Ahmadinejad’s experiences as a
soldier during the Iran-Iraq war might have helped in
shaping his views of the West.
Veterans of the war typically have a distrust
of the West that goes deeper than the standard
mythologies surrounding the 1953 coup. The
documents seized from the US embassy during the
hostage crisis and many other issues were the
touchstones of anti-Americanism ingrained in Iranian
society. Veterans of the war were fighting an
aggressor state that the US tacitly supported. The lack
of intervention by the US when Iraq illegally used
chemical weapons against Iran during the war was
proof to many that the US was bent on destroying the
Islamist regime. Ahmadinejad is adept at invoking the
past wrongs committed by the West upon Iran to shore
up domestic support. It’s suggested that a good deal of
any particular Iranian administrations protestations

against foreigners and Iran’s foreign policy at large is
for the consolidation of power domestically (Takeyh).
Additionally, his refusal to meaningfully negotiate
with Western powers on Iran’s nuclear development
has connected with populist sentiments of national
sovereignty and achievement.
Ahmadinejad’s political career has been
described as unlikely by pundits of Iranian politics
(Kukis). In 2004, the 7th Majli’s elections where
looked at by neo-conservatives like Ahmadinejad as
an opportunity to exact their revenge for the sweeping
electoral wins seen by the reformists in the last
contests. With the reform movement beginning to
sputter, conservatives knew they could not face
another embarrassing loss. They would go to great
lengths to prevent this from occuring. The 2004
elections are largely described as rigged even by
Iranian standards. Approximately 3,000 candidates
were barred from running, including incumbent
deputies, President Khatami’s brother and a large
number of reformists. All of these were disqualified
on the vague accusation that they were “un-Islamic.
The seizure of Parliament by the neo-cons can
be looked at as a turning point in the Iranian political
landscape. The election of a conservative candidate to
the presidency didn't come as a huge surprise however
that the candidate was Ahmadinejad came as a
surprise to many. Out of eight candidates permitted to
run, only three stood a real chance in the eyes of
observers; the conservative Qalibaf, the reformist
Mostafa Moin and the centrist former President
Rafsanjani. The conservative vote was split between
Rafsanjani and Qalibaf. Rafsanjani lacked the
political support of the Supreme Leader and was
looked at as corrupt. Still, he was the candidate
considered most likely to win (Ehteshami and Zeiri).
As polling began leading up to the election, hard-line
leaders decided to switch their support from Qalibaf
to the trailing Ahmadinejad (Ansari M, Iran Under
Ahmadinejad). This influx of money and resources
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launched what had been a well-run but limited
campaign to one of a national contender. The first
round of voting had the top two candidates;
Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad —in that order. During
the second round of voting, the reform press now
without a candidate to support, threw their influence
behind Rafsanjani. This was problematic because
they had been heavily criticizing Rafsanjani’s insider
status and alleged corruptness.
Ahmadinejad won the 2005 Presidential
Elections however was met with consternation from
many Iranians. Opponents and reformist press outlets
labeled him the “Iranian Taliban” and feared he
would roll back social reforms made by the two term
president Khatami (Dehghanpisheh). Although his
victory marked a huge triumph for the neoconservative movement, his tenure as president has
been less than stellar. Iran’s economy is currently in
crisis and oil prices have dropped significantly thus
Iran’s economy has suffered. Iran is plagued with
high and rising unemployment with inflation being
reported at near 30% (Aspden).
Due to the strained relations with the West, Iran has
looked East for both political and material support.
Russia and China stepped in to provide the support
and have used their positions on the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) to protect Iran from
condemnation by Western powers frustrated with
Iran’s nuclear progress.
In 2006 and 2007, Russia backed the passing
of sanctions against Iran in regards to its nuclear
program. However since then it has shielded Iran in
the UNSC. In October 2009 while addressing Asian
leaders in Beijing, Putin warned of pursuing further
sanctions against Iran in regards to Iran’s nuclear
program. Calling them “premature,” and he offered
that there is, “no need to frighten the
Iranians.” (Associated Press, 2009) All is not what it
seems in Moscow however. A month earlier in
September 2009, Obama announced the reversal of a
Bush-era project to establish a missile defense system

in Poland, ostensibly being built to combat Iranian
medium-range missiles. Russia objected on the
grounds that it too greatly affected Russia’s strategic
security. It is widely speculated that Obama’s
decision to scrap the defense system was a gamble to
persuade (or extort) Russia into taking a harder line
on Iran within the UNSC. (Spiegel, 2009) Obama’s
gamble appears to have paid off, at least for now. In
late November of 2009, the International Atomic
Energy Association (IAEA) passed a resolution on
Iran’s lack of co-operation in its nuclear program
referring the matter to the UNSC. The vote passed
with support from both Russia and China. Russia’s
positive comments on the possibilities of sanctions
can be seen as a direct quid pro quo for the US’s
decision to scrap the missile program. (Cooper &
Broad, 2009)
Chinese-Iranian relations have been positive
for many decades. Iran and China started coming
together in the late 1960’s as China became more
antagonistic towards then Soviet Russia. The Shah
saw an opportunity as Russia’s support for the
Communist Tudeh party within Iran had caused the
Shah domestic headaches. Trade relations continued
to increase and normalized diplomatic relations began
under the Shah in the early 1970’s. The toppling of
that regime in 1979 would have only a momentary
effect on relations. The Chinese government wasted
no time courting the fresh revolution —apologizing
for any cooperation with the Shah and recognizing
the new Islamic Republic of Iran. By the end of the
1980’s, total trade between the two countries totaled
$1.627 billion. (Dorraj & Currier, Summer 2008)
Iran and China have become linked
economically in more dynamic ways than those in
which Iran had become previously linked with
Russia, making the situation much more difficult for
the United States than it had been previously. With
the growth of China’s middle class, there has been an
increase in that country's energy consumption.
Currently, 14% of China’s oil is imported from Iran
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and that’s just the start.
China’s state owned China National Petroleum Corp.,
over the last year and a half, has signed multiple deals
to develop Iran’s oil fields. These deals to date total
an estimated $120 billion dollars. (Walt, 2009) With
most contracts throughout the Middle East owned by
Western companies, it represented an opportunity to
establish lucrative contracts, guaranteed energy for its
ever increasing population and opening up new
markets for Chinese goods. China is now Iran’s top
trading partner, importing everything from consumer
goods, infrastructure supplies and weapons. (Walt,
2009) China makes no effort to disguise this growing
relationship. At a meeting between Chinese Premier
Wen Jiabao and an Iranian official in Beijing, Wen
was quoted as saying, "The Sino-Iran relationship has
witnessed rapid development, as the two countries'
leaders have had frequent exchanges, and cooperation
in trade and energy has widened and
deepened," (Xiang, 2009) These energy deals could
have huge consequences for nuclear negotiations with
Tehran. As China invests more into Iran and seeks
ever greater oil supplies from Iran, it will give Iran a
boldness to demand more from China on its behalf.
Sanctions that involve withdrawing business
investments or boycotting Iranian oil could be
damaging enough to China that they would, in fact,
need to veto the measure in the UNSC.
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